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THEY’RE JUST LETTING ANYONE IN THESE DAYS: THE
EXPANSION OF § 523(A)(5)’S “DOMESTIC SUPPORT
OBLIGATION” EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE
INTRODUCTION
In the Western District of Oklahoma in 2010, a woman named Stephanie
Tucker, a single widowed mother, suddenly became responsible for $15,405 in
attorney’s fees incurred during litigation in which she had previously
prevailed.1 Her deceased husband’s parents had sued her for custody of their
grandchild, and when Ms. Tucker successfully defended the suit, the court
ordered the grandparents to pay her attorney’s fees.2 However, when the
grandparents filed for bankruptcy, the court decided that these fees were
dischargeable in part because they were owed to Ms. Tucker.3 Although Ms.
Tucker had prevailed and retained custody in the earlier action, she was
suddenly and inequitably burdened with over $15,000 in fees.
Meanwhile, in 2010, another award of almost $10,000 in attorney’s and
other litigation-related fees were at issue in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of Florida.4 Prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy, a Florida state
court had ordered him to pay the fees and court costs incurred in their divorce
proceedings directly to his ex-wife’s attorney.5 As opposed to the single
widowed mother above, the debtor’s former wife in this instance was not
suddenly confronted with overwhelming fees she needed to pay.6 Instead, the
court ordered the ex-husband to pay the attorney all of these debts and did not
allow them to be discharged.7
1

Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 379 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Brief of Appellant at 8–9, Tucker v. Oliver,
423 B.R. 378 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (No. CIV-09-1137-HE), 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 794 at *4–5.
2 Tucker, 423 B.R. at 379.
3 Id. at 379–81 (“To qualify [as a domestic support obligation], the debt must be owed to or recoverable
by ‘a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible
relative.’ The undisputed facts make it clear that Ms. Tucker, as the former daughter-in-law of the debtors, is
none of these.” (citation omitted) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A) (2006)).
4 Coleman v. Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 857 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010).
5 Id. at 859–60. The debtor owed the fees in question directly to the plaintiff as the attorney to the
debtor’s ex-wife. Id. Additionally, the divorce court had previously ordered the debtor to pay the ex-wife’s
attorney’s fees for the divorce, mortgage payments, and various late fees and interest accrued by her due to the
debtor’s contempt of court, none of which were at issue in this opinion. Id.
6 Id. at 862–63.
7 Id.
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In comparing these cases, the most startling observation is that both
holdings rest on the same statutory provision—§ 523(a)(5)—and the exact
same statutory language.8 This Bankruptcy Code (Code) section allows courts
to declare debts deemed “domestic support obligations” nondischargeable in
bankruptcy.9 How, though, could courts rely on the exact same language and
reach opposite outcomes? This analysis is necessary as courts’ presently
disparate applications of § 523(a)(5) must be remedied if the Code is to meet
its goal of equitable enforcement. This Comment addresses and answers this
question.
Abiding by its general intent to respect and protect support for family
members (especially those made vulnerable through divorce and bankruptcy
proceedings), § 523(a)(5) excepts “domestic support obligations” from
discharge in bankruptcy. Section 101(14A) provides the Code’s only definition
of “domestic support obligation,” specifying four requirements a debt must
satisfy to be nondischargeable as a domestic support obligation.10 One
requirement is that the debt must be owed to, or recoverable by, the “spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor.”11 And while its language may seem
obvious and understandable, courts have struggled to clearly and consistently
interpret this element since Congress codified the original familial support
exception from discharge in 1978.12 The confusion even survived the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA or 2005 Amendments).13 Many would find attempting to define
family to be a complicated and multifaceted task. Likewise, courts have found
it particularly difficult to demarcate the practical scope of “spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor.”14 As a result, courts’ enforcement of the
exception for domestic support obligations is varied and inconsistent and, as

8

See Tucker, 423 B.R. at 381; In re Blackwell, 432 B.R. at 862–63. All “§” in this Comment refer to
sections of title 11 unless otherwise indicated.
9 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006).
10 Id. § 101(14A).
11 Id. § 101(14A)(A). Courts have referred to this provision as the “payee requirement.” Kassicieh v.
Battisti (In re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 473 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
12 Even long before the 2005 Amendments, many scholars studied the issues courts were having
interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). See, e.g., Patricia A. Cullen, Note, Does Anybody Know the Rules in
Federal Divorce Court?: A Case for Revision of Bankruptcy Code § 523, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 427 (1993);
Margaret M. Mahoney, Debts, Divorce, and Disarray in Bankruptcy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 83 (2004); Catherine
E. Vance, Till Debt Do Us Part: Irreconcilable Differences in the Unhappy Union of Bankruptcy and Divorce,
45 BUFF. L. REV. 369 (1997).
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Parts I.B–II.
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demonstrated in the above examples, thwarts the efforts of courts to equitably
and accurately apply the Code.
The majority of courts previously read, and continues to read, the
§ 523(a)(5) payee language out of the statutory requirements.15 As a result,
those courts have consistently held that the payee requirement is broader than
the payees explicitly listed in § 101(14A), finding it to include debts to
attorneys, banks, and other third parties. More recently, however, several
courts have interpreted the payee language and the changes instituted by
BAPCPA as plainly as possible, declaring that only debts owed directly to the
listed payees could be nondischargeable.16 This approach, although a valid one,
is a more literal application than Congress intended.17
To temper the plain meaning analysis of the language so that it fits with the
policy, purpose, and equities involved, courts should combine this “plain
meaning” interpretation with the judicially created limited exception to it.
Courts should embrace this approach as the method by which they analyze
these domestic support obligations. The exception involves investigating the
underlying responsibility for the debt and identifying which of the parties
would ultimately be responsible for paying the obligation if the debt was
discharged because it was not owed directly to one of the listed payees. This
approach would be in accordance with the legislative history, the policy
objectives, and the findings of many other approaches to statutory
construction.18 It would also grant courts greater flexibility when dealing with
individual cases involving domestic support obligations.
Bankruptcy and family law intersect in § 523(a)(5) of the Code. Thus,
discussions involving the interpretation of § 523(a)(5) must also include a
family law perspective. Issues involving domestic support obligations arise
most frequently in situations where either a debtor has been ordered to pay
attorney’s fees after a divorce, third-party fees are incurred during divorce
proceedings (for example, fees to guardians ad litem or child psychologists), or
paternity is at issue.19 Because divorce and bankruptcy frequently occur

15

See infra Parts I.B, II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
17 See infra Part III.A.2, B.3.a.
18 See infra Part III.A.2–3, B.3.
19 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.11[4] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011);
see also Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1489–90 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding fees due to guardian
ad litem and child psychologist nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5)).
16
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concurrently,20 this is an issue that truly affects many individuals and which
necessarily involves multiple courts—bankruptcy and various state courts. In
fairness to the parties involved and in the interest of judicial consistency,
courts should embrace and apply a uniform method of interpreting
§ 523(a)(5)’s payee language.
This Comment offers a uniform approach to the interpretation of the
domestic support obligation “payee requirement” by analyzing the various
interpretive strategies courts have used both pre- and post-200521 and carefully
considering the policy and the corresponding congressional intent of the
amendments related to domestic support. Part I summarizes the history of
divorce and separation debts and the Code sections that regulate them. Part I
also chronicles bankruptcy court decisions prior to BAPCPA and discusses the
courts’ conflicting interpretations of family support obligations. Part II
discusses more current, post-BAPCPA decisions, particularly exploring the
conflicts among the courts, and many courts’ continued reliance on their preBAPCPA interpretations of family support obligations. Part III explores the
specific policy objectives behind the treatment of domestic support obligations
and considers Congress’s intent in altering the domestic support obligation
clause from its previous statutory form. Finally, Part III suggests a way to
reconcile competing forces, including: the plain language of the statute, the
Code sections’ legislative history, the overarching policy objectives, the family
concerns and bankruptcy law equities, and the courts’ currently varied
approaches. Ultimately, this Comment suggests a solution that provides courts
with a process of deciding domestic support obligation cases more uniformly
and comprehensively: the judicially developed exception to the plain meaning
rule.

20 Bankruptcy Site: Statistics, THE PEOPLE’S SITE FOR INFORMATION ON THE NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW,
http://www.bankruptcylawinformation.com/index.cfm?event=dspStats (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). Statistically,
bankruptcy and divorce tend to happen in conjunction with each other. “[Ninety-one percent] of bankruptcy
filers have suffered a job loss, medical event[,] or divorce,” and “[forty percent] of bankruptcies result from
medical crises, unemployment[,] or divorces.” Id. Additionally, “[u]rban areas [are known to] have more
personal bankruptcies than rural areas, a trend that can be explained, in part, by higher divorce rates.” Id.
21 In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
overhauling several areas of the law such as the provisions for domestic support obligations. See generally
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified
as amended in various sections of title 11).

WYCKOFF GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

6/8/2012 10:57 AM

THEY’RE JUST LETTING ANYONE IN THESE DAYS

641

I. SECTION 523(a)(5): ITS PLACE IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND ITS
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
A. Section 523(a)(5) and the Bankruptcy Code
Debtors who choose to file for bankruptcy under chapters 7, 11, or 13 are
able to discharge their outstanding debts after either liquidating their entire
estates or completing their reorganization plans.22 However, the luxury of
discharge is not without limitations. Section 523 contains the exceptions to
discharge, detailing those debts bankruptcy will not eliminate.23 In particular,
§ 523(a)(5) provides that “[a] discharge under [§§] 727, 1141, 1228(a),
1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt . . . for a domestic support obligation . . . .”24
Filing under chapter 7 or 11 means the entire list of obligations in § 523
will be ineligible for discharge.25 However, debtors who file for bankruptcy
under chapter 13 are subject to fewer exceptions—a discrepancy which arose
following a combination of changes made in BAPCPA and the 1994
Amendments.26 Chapter 13 limits the debts that are nondischargeable to those
listed under § 523(a)(1B), (1C), and (2)–(9), but it excludes § 523(a)(15).27
This omission is notable because both § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15) concern
divorce- and separation-related debts.28 Courts dealing with chapter 13 cases
involving those types of debts must, therefore, analyze those obligations

22

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)–(b), 1141(d)(1)(A), 1328(a)–(b) (2006).
See id. § 523.
24 Id. § 523(a)(5).
25 See id. §§ 727(b), 1141(d)(2). Taken together, these provisions mean that, in all of the chapters listed,
debtors remain responsible for domestic support obligations during and after their bankruptcies.
26 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D
§ 57:35, at 57-100 (2008) (“Obligations arise between spouses, particularly former spouses, as a result of
loans, as a means of adjusting a division of property, and often as a means of discharging the duty of support.
Originally, debts traceable to loans and to property divisions were not excepted from the debtor’s discharged
debts. After amendments in 1994 and 2005, however, such property settlement obligations were excepted from
discharges in all cases other than [c]hapter 13. Debts traceable to support are not dischargeable in any chapter
under the Bankruptcy Code.” (footnotes omitted)).
27 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (discharging debts owed to children, former spouses, and spouses not covered
under § 523(a)(5)); see also id. § 523(a)(15). Section 1328(a)(2) essentially makes dischargeable all debts
owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child, that are not considered to be in the nature of support.
28 See id. § 523(a)(5), (15). Section 523(a)(5) excepts domestic support obligations from discharge. Id.
§ 523(a)(5). Section 523(a)(15) excepts debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child that are incurred during
divorce or separation and are not domestic support obligations. Id. § 523(a)(15).
23
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differently than courts dealing with chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcies.29 Although
courts analyze domestic support obligations similarly in all types of
bankruptcy cases, the chapter 13 cases are the most affected by the inclusion of
§ 523(a)(5) and the exclusion of § 523(a)(15).
The differences between § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15) are not vital to the
discussion of the specific payee language in § 523(a)(5). However, an
understanding of the distinction between the two is useful in trying to
comprehend the case law involving domestic support obligations. Section
523(a)(5) deals with “domestic support obligations,” which are obligations
determined to be “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.”30 Section
523(a)(15) deals with marital and family-related debts as well, dictating that all
other debts resulting from divorce or separation agreements are
nondischargeable.31 This provision is known as the “property settlement”
subsection.32 Essentially, the dividing line separating these two types of debts
is the nature of the debt. Section 523(a)(5) covers support obligations, such as
child support and alimony, while § 523(a)(15) governs other divorce- or
separation-related debts involving the division of family assets.33
Courts’ historic problems discerning between domestic support obligations
and property settlements continue to be important issues in divorce and
bankruptcy jurisprudence today.34 These difficulties continue to affect the issue
this Comment addresses, as courts continue to confuse and merge the factors
they use to decide between § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15) obligations, and those
elements necessary to decide if debts are even domestic support obligations in
the first place.35 Procedurally, courts consider a number of factors to determine

29 James A. Patten & Craig D. Martinson, Avoiding Traps for the Divorce Lawyer: Changes in Laws
Affect Your Briefs on Domestic Obligation, MONT. LAW., Sept. 2008, at 8, 8–9, 31.
30 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A)(B), 523(a)(5).
31 Id. § 523(a)(15).
32 4 COLLIER, supra note 19, ¶ 523.11[1]; see also Daniel A. Austin, For Debtor or Worse: Discharge of
Marital Debt Obligations Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 51
WAYNE L. REV. 1369, 1395 (2005) (noting Third Circuit case law discussing the difference between a supportbased obligation and a property settlement (citing Gianakis v. Gianakis (In re Gianakis), 917 F.2d 759, 762 (3d
Cir. 1990))); Shayna M. Steinfeld, The Impact of Changes Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on Family Obligations, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 251, 255–56 (2007)
(discussing, in the context of chapter 13 cases, a nondischargeable domestic support obligation and a
“dischargeable property settlement/non-domestic support obligation”).
33 See 4 COLLIER, supra note 19, ¶ 523.11[1]; Austin, supra note 32, at 1385–87.
34 See generally Austin, supra note 32, at 1371–72.
35 See id. at 1384; see also Coleman v. Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 861–63 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2010); In re Rose, No. 08-30051, 2008 WL 4205364, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2008).
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the difference between obligations in the nature of support and property
settlements.36 If that analysis indicates that the debt is in the nature of support,
the court then decides whether the debt is a domestic support obligation. That
step in the process is when the payee requirement becomes an issue. This
Comment focuses on the payee requirement of § 523(a)(5) and the second step
outlined above—specifically, whether the language of the statute actually
limits nondischargeability to those debts owed directly to the listed payees or
whether the payee language is unimportant to the determination of
nondischargeability as a domestic support obligation. This uncertainty must be
resolved in order to maintain the integrity of the Code and the judicial system
that applies it.
1. The Genesis of § 523(a)(5): Family Support Obligations and the History
of Their Codification as Nondischargeable Debts
Even before their codification in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as
nondischargeable debts, alimony and child support were, for policy reasons,
already considered nondischargeable.37 Congress codified these policy
objectives in § 523(a)(5) and afforded distinctive treatment to debts considered
child and spousal support.38 After multiple amendments to the Code, these
debts, presently referred to as domestic support obligations, continue to enjoy a
virtually unequaled priority status among other bankruptcy debts39 and
comprise a solidly established exception to the general rule of discharge.40
2. Changes Made by the 2005 Amendments
In 2005, Congress overhauled the Code, attempting to address concerns
that had developed since the last major Code revision41 and discourage debtors
from filing for bankruptcy by making the requirements more difficult to
36

4 COLLIER, supra note 19, ¶ 523.11[6].
Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., The Bankruptcy Reform Act and Its Effect on Family Law Proceedings,
Judgments and Agreements, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 657, 657 n.1 (1994); see also Austin, supra note 32, at
1384 (“Bankruptcy courts have long recognized marital and child support obligations as a unique type of debt
to be treated differently from other forms of secured debt due to the vulnerability of former spouses and
dependents.”).
38 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006)); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320.
39 11 U.S.C § 507(a)(1) (stating domestic support obligations hold first priority, following only trustee’s
fees).
40 Id. § 523(a)(5), (15).
41 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
37
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meet.42 BAPCPA was a purported response to increasing consumer filings,
overwhelming numbers of serial filings, and abuse of the system.43 The House
Judiciary Committee indicated that the bill’s purpose was to “improve
bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity
in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and
creditors.”44 Essentially, the 2005 Amendments increased creditor protections
and attempted to reduce the number of abusive or manipulative filings by
debtors.45
The 2005 Amendments specifically altered § 523(a)(5) in several ways,46
with a few notable changes that are essential to any discussion of the payee
requirement.47 Congress removed the pertinent language from § 523(a)(5) and
replaced it with “domestic support obligations,” necessitating the definition of
that term in § 101.48 The definition in § 101(14A) contains essentially the same
language that had been present in the pre-2005 § 523(a)(5) but in a different
structure.49 Instead of using a paragraph-based format, Congress took the four
requirements contained in the pre-2005 paragraph form and structured them so
that they were listed as four separate elements, each necessary for the
classification of a debt as a nondischargeable domestic support obligation.50
These alterations essentially compromise the bases upon which some courts
have deviated from the majority decisions that guided both pre- and post-2005
cases.51

42

See id.
Id.
44 Id.
45 See id. at 3–5.
46 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§§ 211, 215, 119 Stat. 23, 50–51, 54 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5) (2006)).
47 See 2 COLLIER, supra note 19, ¶ 101.14A.
48 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5).
49 Austin, supra note 32, at 1390–91 (discussing the alterations made to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A) and
523(a)(5)). Section 101(14A) makes nondischargeable debts to “a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor . . . in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . of such spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)–(B).
50 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 §§ 211, 215; Austin, supra note
32, at 1390–91.
51 See, e.g., Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 379–81 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Loe, Warren, Rosenfield,
Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R. 761, 763–65, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2007).
43

WYCKOFF GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

6/8/2012 10:57 AM

THEY’RE JUST LETTING ANYONE IN THESE DAYS

645

3. The Current Status of § 523(a)(5)
Today, § 523(a)(5) simply lists “domestic support obligation[s]” as
nondischargeable.52 The current Code defines a domestic support obligation in
§ 101(14A) as follows:
The term “domestic support obligation” means a debt that accrues
before, on, or after the date of the order for relief in a case under this
title, including interest that accrues on that debt as provided under
applicable nonbankruptcy law notwithstanding any other provision of
this title, that is—(A) owed to or recoverable by—(i) a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal
guardian, or responsible relative; or (ii) a governmental unit; (B) in
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support (including assistance
provided by a governmental unit) of such spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor or such child’s parent, without regard to whether
such debt is expressly so designated; (C) established or subject to
establishment before, on, or after the date of the order for relief in a
case under this title, by reason of applicable provisions of—(i) a
separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement
agreement; (ii) an order of a court of record; or (iii) a determination
made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law by a
governmental unit; and (D) not assigned to a governmental entity,
unless that obligation is assigned voluntarily by the spouse, former
spouse, child of the debtor, or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or
53
responsible relative for the purpose of collecting the debt.

Both the Code section laying out the exceptions to discharge54 and the Code
section outlining priorities for unsecured creditor payment55 contain this
definition.
Courts and scholars are still assessing the repercussions of the 2005
Amendments.56 For now, although Congress attempted to clarify many

52

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
Id. § 101(14A).
54 Id. § 523(a)(5).
55 Id. § 507(a)(1) (“The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order: (1) First: (A)
Allowed unsecured claims for domestic support obligations that, as of the date of filing of the petition in a case
under this title, are owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
56 See generally Austin, supra note 32; Steinfeld, supra note 32.
53
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sections of the Code, domestic support obligations continue to lack clarity and
evade judicial uniformity.57
B. Judicial Interpretations of § 523(a)(5)’s Payee Requirement Prior to the
2005 Amendments
Prior to the 2005 Amendments, most courts failed to evaluate fully all of
the requirements necessary to declare debts nondischargeable as family support
obligations under § 523(a)(5).58 Most courts primarily focused on whether the
debt was in the nature of support when making these determinations.59 This
often meant disregarding some or all of the other requirements listed in
§ 523(a)(5), either by ignoring the payee requirement completely or by
interpreting it extremely broadly.60
Some courts, however, followed the language of § 523(a)(5) beyond the
initial support determination and considered the payee requirement.61 Those
courts noted that the payee requirement existed and performed a more
thorough analysis of the debts.62 In determining nondischargeability, these
courts created an exception to the plain meaning of the payee language and
evaluated whether, although the debt was not owed directly to one of the listed
parties, a specifically named payee would remain liable for the debt if the court
discharged it.63
It is important to recognize that, prior to 2005, courts based their decisions
on an earlier version of the Code. The pertinent section, § 523(a)(5), excepted
from discharge debts

57 Compare Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 379–82 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (holding attorney’s fees due to
former daughter-in-law not within payee requirement), with Coleman v. Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 432 B.R.
856, 861–63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (finding attorney’s fees owed directly to ex-wife’s attorney within payee
requirement).
58 See, e.g., Dvorak v. Carlson (In re Dvorak), 986 F.2d 940, 941 (5th Cir. 1993); Gianakis v. Gianakis
(In re Gianakis), 917 F.2d 759, 762–64 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Seibert, 914 F.2d 102, 105–07 (7th Cir. 1990).
59 See, e.g., In re Dvorak, 986 F.2d at 941; In re Gianakis, 917 F.2d at 762–64; In re Seibert, 914 F.2d at
105–07.
60 See, e.g., In re Dvorak, 986 F.2d at 941 (failing to discuss payee requirement completely vis-à-vis fees
of guardian ad litem); In re Gianakis, 917 F.2d at 762–64 (ignoring the payee requirement completely by
disregarding mortgagee’s role as the direct payee of the debtor); In re Seibert, 914 F.2d at 105 n.5 (“The
statutory requirement that the debt be owed to a child of the debtor is to be read broadly.”).
61 See Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Kassicieh v. Battisti (In
re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 477–78 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
62 See In re Spong, 661 F.2d at 10–11; see also In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. at 477–78.
63 See, e.g., In re Spong, 661 F.2d at 10–11; see also In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. at 477–78.
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to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection
with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement
agreement, but not to the extent that—(A) such debt is assigned to
another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise . . . ; or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance,
or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
64
maintenance, or support . . . .

These pre-2005 cases are important to understand because they continue to
guide much of the jurisprudence in this area today, regardless of the alterations
made by BAPCPA.65
1. Courts that Only Considered the Nature of the Debt Important in
Determining § 523(a)(5) Dischargeability
Prior to the 2005 Amendments, an overwhelming number of courts refused
to allow the identity of a payee—other than the debtor’s child, spouse, or exspouse—to interfere with a finding that a debt was nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(5).66 They tended to consider only whether the debt was in the nature

64

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982) (emphasis added) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006)).
In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. at 476–78 (discussing various post-BAPCPA cases, all of which invoke preBAPCPA case law to analyze the issue); see also In re Andrews, 434 B.R. 541, 546–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
2010).
66 See, e.g., Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding fees due
directly to guardian ad litem as nondischargeable family support obligation); Stark v. Bishop (In re Bishop),
No. 97-2151, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12900, at *4–9 (4th Cir. June 18, 1998) (finding fees payable directly to
attorney ad litem nondischargeable); Strickland v. Shannon (In re Strickland), 90 F.3d 444, 445–47 (11th Cir.
1996) (holding that fees payable to debtor’s ex-spouse and the ex-spouse’s attorney were nondischargeable
family support obligations); Holliday v. Kline (In re Kline), 65 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding attorney
fees directly payable to attorney nondischargeable); Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1488–89
(10th Cir. 1995) (fees directly payable to guardian ad litem and child psychologist nondischargeable); In re
Dvorak, 986 F.2d 940, 941 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding guardian ad litem fees nondischargeable); Gianakis v.
Gianakis (In re Gianakis), 917 F.2d 759, 763–64 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding debtor’s assumption of ex-spouse’s
second mortgage in divorce in nature of support and nondischargeable); In re Seibert, 914 F.2d 102, 104–07
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding court order requiring debtor to pay county agency for costs of providing medical care
for birth of debtor’s child nondischargeable); Calhoun v. Long (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir.
1983) (broadly holding that “payments in the nature of support need not be made directly to the spouse or
dependent to be nondischargeable” after discussing lower court decisions on hold harmless agreements);
Blackburn-Gardner v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 261 B.R. 523, 524–27 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding
claim for attorney’s fees brought by ex-spouse’s attorney nondischargeable as family support obligation);
Madden v. Staggs (In re Staggs), 203 B.R. 712, 717–19, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (holding fees to
guardian ad litem nondischargeable, viewing the “character of the fees” and not the ultimate responsibility for
them determinative); Spear v. Constantine (In re Constantine), 183 B.R. 335, 335–37 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995)
(holding guardian ad litem fees nondischargeable). But see DeKalb Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Children Servs. v.
65
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of support and left the analysis at that, rather than confirming that the debt
fulfilled the rest of the requirements in § 523(a)(5).67
In re Kline and In re Staggs characterize the approaches of the Eighth
Circuit and the majority of courts on this issue.68 These cases are examples of
the analysis that almost every circuit consistently used in construing the
§ 523(a)(5) payee language, with various circuit-level decisions in the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopting
similar logic.69
In In re Kline, the ex-wife’s attorney filed a claim against his client’s exhusband, seeking to have his fees declared nondischargeable.70 The ex-wife
incurred the fees during her divorce proceedings with the debtor, and the
divorce court ordered the ex-husband to pay them.71 On appeal, while

Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding fees to local county agency expended on
behalf of debtor’s child dischargeable because agency was not listed payee in § 523(a)(5)).
67 See, e.g., In re Chang, 163 F.3d at 1141–42; In re Bishop, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12900, at *4–9; In
re Strickland, 90 F.3d at 445–47; In re Kline, 65 F.3d at 751; In re Miller, 55 F.3d at 1488–89; In re Dvorak,
986 F.2d at 941; In re Gianakis, 917 F.2d at 763–64; In re Seibert, 914 F.2d at 104–07; In re Calhoun, 715
F.2d at 1107; In re Edwards, 261 B.R. at 524–27; In re Staggs, 203 B.R. at 717–19, 721; In re Constantine,
183 B.R. at 335–37. But see In re Platter, 140 F.3d at 681.
68 See, e.g., In re Kline, 65 F.3d at 751; In re Staggs, 203 B.R. at 717. Some courts have viewed In re
Kline as falling into the more limited exception due to its discussion of the possible liability of the debtor’s exwife to the plaintiff in quantum meruit if the debtor was able to discharge the debt. See Simon, Schindler &
Sandberg, LLP v. Gentilini (In re Gentilini), 365 B.R. 251, 254–55 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); see also In re
Kline, 65 F.3d at 751. Other courts, however, have considered that In re Kline also supports focusing primarily
on the nature of the debt and not on the specific payee. See, e.g., In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. at 475, 477
(recognizing that statements in In re Kline could support either view). This Comment places In re Kline in the
latter group—that is, the group focusing almost exclusively on the payee—for the reasons detailed below. See
infra note 162.
69 Compare In re Kline, 65 F.3d at 751, and In re Staggs, 203 B.R. at 717, with In re Chang, 163 F.3d at
1141–42, In re Bishop, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12900, at *4–9, In re Strickland, 90 F.3d at 445–47, In re
Miller, 55 F.3d at 1488–89, In re Dvorak, 986 F.2d at 941, In re Gianakis, 917 F.2d at 763–64, In re Seibert,
914 F.2d at 104–07, In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1107, In re Edwards, 261 B.R. at 524–27, and In re
Constantine, 183 B.R. at 335–37. There does not seem to be a circuit opinion on point in the D.C. Circuit.
Additionally, though there does not seem to be a circuit-level case on point in the First Circuit, this did not
stop lower courts from adopting this rationale. See, e.g., In re Constantine, 183 B.R. at 335–37. There is also
some debate as to which perspective was adopted in the Second Circuit. This Comment views In re Spong as
supporting the limited exception to the plain meaning. See infra Part I.B.2. However, other parties have viewed
In re Spong as favoring the majority tendency to fundamentally ignore the payee requirement. See In re
Chang, 163 F.3d at 1141–42; In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. at 474–75. The Second Circuit has also elsewhere
upheld payment to third parties where there was no showing that the arguable beneficiary would have been
liable if the debt was discharged. See Peters v. Hennenhoeffer (In re Peters), 133 B.R. 291, 294–96 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), aff’d, 964 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
70 In re Kline, 65 F.3d at 750.
71 Id.
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considering § 523(a)(5), the circuit court believed that “the statute continue[d]
to except from discharge attorney fees, even if payable to an attorney rather
than to a former spouse, if such fees are in the nature of maintenance or
support of the former spouse or of the child of the debtor.”72 The Kline court
used policy arguments to support its assertion, noting that § 523(a)(5)’s policy
“‘favors enforcement of familial support obligations over a “fresh start” for the
debtor.’”73
In In re Staggs, a guardian ad litem who had represented a child in a postdivorce custody proceeding attempted to declare the money owed to her by the
child’s father (the debtor) nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5).74 In considering
her claim, the bankruptcy court expounded at length that the debt must be in
the nature of support, stating that, when “deciding whether to characterize an
award as maintenance or support[,] the crucial issue is the function the award
was intended to serve.”75 The debtor argued that the fees should be
dischargeable because they did not meet the payee requirement, but the court
rejected that argument,76 quoting In re Stacey: “Although the monies are not
paid to the child, they are paid to a third party strictly for the benefit of the
child.”77 The bankruptcy judge noted that “[t]he fact that the minor child would
not be responsible for paying the guardian ad litem fees in the event the [c]ourt
declared the fees to be dischargeable [did] not change the character of the
fees.”78 Ultimately, the court settled with the popular judicial notion that the
debt was nondischargeable because it was in the nature of support for children,
even if it did not fall within the literal language of the payee requirement.79
These rulings are examples of the typical decisions concerning § 523(a)(5)
prior to the 2005 Amendments.80 They epitomize the tendency of courts to
simply disregard or minimize the payee language and decide primarily based
on whether the debt is in the nature of support.81

72

Id. at 751.
Id. (quoting In re Miller, 55 F.3d at 1489).
74 In re Staggs, 203 B.R. at 714.
75 Id. at 719 (quoting Adams v. Zentz, 963 F.2d 197, 200 (8th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
76 In re Staggs, 203 B.R. at 721.
77 Id. (quoting Baillargeon v. Stacey (In re Stacey), 164 B.R. 210, 212 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994)) (internal
quotations marks omitted).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 717–19.
80 See Kassicieh v. Battisti (In re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 474–76 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
81 See id.
73
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2. Courts that Created an Exception and Considered § 523(a)(5)’s Payee
Requirement
A small subset of courts considered the payee’s identity in their decisions
and created a limited exception to the plain meaning of § 523(a)(5)’s payee
requirement.82 Under these circumstances, the courts considered the identity of
the payee by determining who would be liable for the debt if it were to be
discharged (i.e., would responsibility for the debt then shift from the debtor to
a third party?) and whether that person was one of the statute’s designated
payees.83
For example, in In re Spong, the Second Circuit considered the
dischargeability of an obligation a debtor–husband owed to his ex-spouse’s
attorney for the fees incurred during the divorce proceedings.84 In finding that
the debt was a nondischargeable family support obligation, the court
distinguished between the “assumption of a debt” and a third-party beneficiary
contract, explaining that “appellee’s undertaking to pay his wife’s legal fees
[w]as a paradigmatic third party beneficiary contract, which is not . . . an
assignment.”85 It was then necessary for the court to determine whether the
contract fit under § 523(a)(5); seeking guidance, the court referred to the
statements of the House Judiciary Committee, which explained, “This
provision will, however, make nondischargeable any debts resulting from an
agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor’s spouse harmless on joint debts, to
the extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or
support of the spouse . . . .”86 Additionally, the court discussed the fact that
“[i]f appellee fails to satisfy his obligation to [the appealing attorney], the third
party beneficiary, appellee will, at the same time, fail to satisfy his obligation
to his wife, the promisee.”87 The court reasoned that, if the debtor failed to pay
his ex-wife’s attorney’s fees, he thus failed to satisfy an obligation to her, and
that reasoning justified the finding of nondischargeability even though the
attorney—the direct payee—was not an individual listed in the statute.88

82
83
84
85
86
87
88

See, e.g., Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 10–11 (2d Cir. 1981).
In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. at 472, 477–79.
In re Spong, 661 F.2d at 7–8.
Id. at 10.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320).
Id. at 10–11.
Id.
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This Second Circuit decision outlines the alternate approach courts took
prior to 2005.89 While respecting the plain meaning of § 523(a)(5)’s payee
language, these courts fashioned an exception that allowed them to circumvent
the limited and strict list of payees but remain true to the intent of the statute.
This discussion illustrates the two general approaches courts took when
interpreting § 523(a)(5) prior to 2005. The majority basically read the payee
requirement out of the statutory language. During the same period, a few select
courts fashioned an exception to the plain meaning of the statute, considering
the party ultimately responsible for the obligation if discharged.90
Courts have generally continued making decisions this way through the
2005 Amendments. However, the judicially created exception to the plain
meaning has gained more force, and a new faction of courts has emerged and is
adhering to the plain meaning of § 523(a)(5),91 thus igniting a statutory
interpretation debate.
II. SECTION 523(A)(5) DECISIONS POST-BAPCPA: DO COURTS TODAY
CONSIDER THE PAYEE REQUIREMENT IN DETERMINING
NONDISCHARGEABILITY UNDER § 523(A)(5)?
Section 523(a)(5)’s payee requirement language has continued to confound
courts through the comprehensive 2005 Amendments. In fact, courts currently
approach § 523(a)(5) issues from three different angles, rather than the two
paths that courts took prior to BAPCPA.92 The two prior interpretations of the
payee language have continued—some courts still read the payee requirement
out of the statute, and others continue to focus on the exception to the plain
language of § 523(a)(5).93 A third approach has emerged which uses the
BAPCPA alterations as support for remaining true to the plain language of the
statute.94

89

See Kassicieh v. Battisti (In re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 477–79 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
Compare Kline v. Kline (In re Kline), 65 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1995), and Madden v. Staggs (In re
Staggs), 203 B.R. 712, 717–19 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996), with In re Spong, 661 F.2d at 10–11.
91 See infra Part II.A.
92 See supra Part I.B.
93 See infra Part II.B, C.
94 See infra Part II.A.
90

WYCKOFF GALLEYSFINAL

652

6/8/2012 10:57 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

A. Courts Adopting a Plain Meaning Approach to § 523(a)(5)’s Payee
Requirement
Several courts have begun to oppose the pre-BAPCPA majority approach
and have applied the plain meaning of the amended § 523(a)(5) and,
consequently, the new § 101(14A) definition of domestic support obligations.95
These courts interpret the 2005 Amendments, along with the policy and
congressional purpose behind the domestic support obligation exception, as an
indication that Congress intended greater judicial focus on the payee’s
identity.96 Such decisions are rare, but they are becoming more prevalent.
Tucker v. Oliver demonstrates an Oklahoma district court’s application of
the plain meaning of § 523(a)(5).97 In Tucker, the debtor’s former daughter-inlaw filed an action to have the debt owed her by her former husband’s parents
declared nondischargeable after the former husband’s parents had
unsuccessfully sued their former daughter-in-law for custody of their
granddaughter.98 In the prior custody action, the court ordered the grandparents
to pay their former daughter-in-law’s attorney’s fees.99 Considering the
dischargeability of those attorney fees, the district court found that the debt in
question did not satisfy the payee requirements of § 523(a)(5) and § 101(14A)
and was, thus, dischargeable.100 In determining that precedent did not apply
due to the 2005 Amendments, the court stated:
[T]he statutory language spelling out the pertinent exception to
discharge has been modified since Miller. . . . In 2005, Congress
adopted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, which amended § 523(a)(5) . . . . The new definition is
substantially similar in many respects, but it does identify certain
specific and additional groups of persons to which it applies. This
suggests a conscious decision on Congress’[s] part to focus on which
debtors were, or were not, within the scope of the nondischargeability
101
provision.

95 See, e.g., Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 379–81 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Loe, Warren, Rosenfield,
Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R. 761, 763–65, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2007).
96 See, e.g., Tucker, 423 B.R. at 379–81; In re Brooks, 371 B.R. at 763–65, 768.
97 See Tucker, 423 B.R. at 378.
98 Id. at 379.
99 Id. at 382.
100 Id. at 380–81.
101 Id. at 381 (internal citations omitted) (discussing Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1490
(10th Cir. 1995)).
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In essence, the court decided that the 2005 Amendments, by placing the
requirement as to whom the debt is owed into a subsection separate from the
nature of the obligation, had so substantially altered § 523(a)(5) that previous
circuit-level case law was no longer binding.102 The court held that the debt
was therefore dischargeable for two reasons: one, the debt was not owed to any
of the listed payees; and two, it was not in the nature of support.103 The fact
that the case was decided on both of those grounds, and not the payee
requirement, does not change the importance of the court’s analysis regarding
the payee requirement.
A bankruptcy court in the Fifth Circuit recently followed the “plain
meaning rule” in deciding a case about domestic support obligations.104 In re
Brooks concerned a law firm that filed a complaint against its client’s debtorex-husband to declare his obligation to pay his ex-wife’s attorney’s fees
nondischargeable.105 The bankruptcy court reasoned that
[e]ven assuming the Final Judgment is a debt “in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support,” the Firm is not Debtor’s spouse,
Debtor’s former spouse, or Debtor’s child; nor Debtor’s child’s
parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; nor a governmental
unit. As none of these, the Firm does not fall within the ambit of
[§] 101(14A) and is not an entity to whom a “domestic support
106
obligation” may be owed under [§] 523(a)(5).

The court held that, “applying the plain meaning rule, the [f]irm is not an entity
to which may be owed a nondischargeable divorce-related debt.”107 Discussing
the policy behind its decision, the court emphasized that Congress had not
intended to allow the debtor’s family or former family to serve as a mechanism
through which other individuals or entities could seek to be paid.108 Instead,
Congress intended § 523(a)(5) to benefit only the family members
themselves.109 The court emphasized that although Congress had the power to
add attorneys to the list of payees while amending the section, it had not done

102

Id.
Id. at 381–82.
104 See Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R.
761, 763–65 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
105 Id. at 762–63.
106 Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
107 Id. at 764–65.
108 Id. at 765.
109 Id.
103
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so.110 Like the Tucker court, the Brooks court reasoned that Congress’s 2005
reformatting of the statutory language was “not to broaden the category of
entities that may assert that debts owed to them are non-dischargeable.”111
Even in the face of prior cases to the contrary,112 the Brooks court
unequivocally interpreted § 523(a)(5) plainly and limited the characterization
of debts as nondischargeable domestic support obligations to those strictly
within the payee requirement.113
B. Courts Continuing To Consider Only the Nature of the Debt in
Determining § 523(a)(5) Dischargeability
Since the 2005 Amendments, a majority of courts continue to rule on
domestic support obligation exceptions to discharge without any serious
consideration of the payee requirement contained in § 523(a)(5) by reference to
§ 101(14A).114 Following pre-2005 precedent, these courts are of the opinion
that the changes made to the Code in 2005 were not substantial enough to alter
prior interpretations of § 523(a)(5) and support obligations.115
Prensky v. Clair Greifer LLP is an example of the Third Circuit’s approach
to domestic support obligations.116 In this case, the district court found that the
debtor’s obligation to his ex-wife’s attorneys for fees from the divorce
proceeding could fairly be classified as a domestic support obligation.117 The
district court considered the debt’s dischargeability under both § 523(a)(5) and
§ 523(a)(15) because the debtor had filed under chapter 7, where both types of
obligations would be nondischargeable.118 Although the bankruptcy court
110

Id. at 768.
Id. at 765.
112 See Dvorak v. Carlson (In re Dvorak), 986 F.2d 940, 941 (5th Cir. 1993), cited in In re Brooks, 371
B.R. at 768; Hill v. Snider (In re Snider), 62 B.R. 382, 385 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986), cited in In re Brooks, 371
B.R. at 768.
113 In re Brooks, 371 B.R. at 763–67.
114 See Kassicieh v. Battisti (In re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 476–77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); see also
Kennedy v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), BAP No. AZ-09-1035-JuPaDu, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3169, at *18–19
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2010); Prensky v. Clair Greifer LLP, No. 09-6200 (FLW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66181, at *25–27 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010); Levin v. Greco, 415 B.R. 663, 666–67 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Coleman v.
Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 862 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Rose, No. 08-30051, 2008 WL
4205364, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2008).
115 See In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. at 476–77; see also In re Kennedy, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3169, at *18–19;
Prensky, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66181, at *25–27; Levin, 415 B.R. at 666–67; In re Blackwell, 432 B.R. at
862; In re Rose, 2008 WL 4205364, at *3–4.
116 Prensky, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66181.
117 Id. at *24–27.
118 Id. at *10–12, 22–27.
111
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below had found the debt nondischargeable pursuant solely to § 523(a)(15), on
appeal, the district court explained that the attorney’s fees could also be
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5).119 The district court emphasized the
language contained in § 101(14A), specifically “that the debt be in the nature
of . . . support . . . of such spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such
child’s parent, without regard to whether such debt is expressly so
designated.”120 This emphasis indicates that the Third Circuit’s focus on the
designation of the debt as support and the lack of focus on the payee
requirement121 has survived the 2005 Amendments. Indeed, the only place
where the court possibly acknowledged the payee requirement was when it
noted that “dischargeability must be determined by the substance of the
liability rather than its form”122—a phrase courts typically employ to bypass
the requirement that the nondischargeable debt be paid directly to a statutorily
defined payee.123
Following Sixth Circuit precedent, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee held that a debt owed to a guardian ad litem was a
domestic support obligation in In re Rose.124 This case dealt with the priority
provision in § 507, which encompasses the § 101(14A) domestic support
obligation definition125 and therefore requires that the court analyze the same
underlying issues as when interpreting § 523(a)(5).126 The court declared the
debts nondischargeable child support obligations but failed to consider the
payee’s identity and focused solely on the nature of the debt.127 In deciding this

119

Id. at *22–27.
Id. at *25 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 See Gianakis v. Gianakis (In re Gianakis), 917 F.2d 759, 762–64 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding an
assumption of a second mortgage to be in the “nature of alimony, maintenance, and support”).
122 Prensky, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66181, at *25 (quoting Gilman v. Golio (In re Golio), 393 B.R. 56, 63
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 See, e.g., Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Gentry
(In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995).
124 In re Rose, No. 08-30051, 2008 WL 4205364, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2008).
125 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (making “[a]llowed unsecured claims for domestic support obligations” first
in priority).
126 In re Rose, 2008 WL 4205364, at *3–4.
127 Id. at *9 (holding the guardian ad litem’s actions on behalf of the minor child were for support and
maintenance of the child during proceedings in juvenile court and therefore constituted a domestic support
obligation).
120
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way, the court acknowledged the changes made by BAPCPA, but it
nevertheless found case law construing the former § 523(a)(5) persuasive.128
In the Seventh Circuit, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois overturned a bankruptcy court decision applying the plain meaning and
held that an obligation for child representative fees was a nondischargeable
domestic support obligation in Levin v. Greco.129 Levin had been a child
representative—a more active version of a guardian ad litem in Illinois—for
Greco’s children during his divorce proceedings.130 The district court
considered the issue of fees owed to a child representative as one of first
impression in the Seventh Circuit, although it observed that pre-BAPCPA
precedent “endorsed the notion that [§] 523(a)(5) can except debts owed to
third parties.”131 The court took note that, as of that point, six circuits had
interpreted the domestic support exception as encompassing debts owed to
third parties if the debt was in the nature of support.132 The court explained that
within these circuit decisions there were two interpretations: the limited
exception to the plain meaning rule (as seen in the pre-2005 case law) and the
majority trend of evaluating only whether the debt is in the nature of support
while ignoring the payee requirement.133 The Levin court decided to follow
both the Tenth Circuit decision in In re Miller, which advocated the “substance
over form” approach that ignored the payee requirement,134 and the Second
Circuit decision in In re Spong, which the Levin court considered the origin of
this body of case law.135 However, the opinion made little mention of the
potential liability of the ex-spouse for the debt and relied primarily on In re
Miller, discussing In re Spong only incidentally.136 This suggests that in this
case, the district court followed the majority (rather than the limited exception
128 Id. at *3 (“[C]ase law construing the former [§] 523(a)(5) is relevant and persuasive.” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev. v. Ratliff, 390 B.R. 607, 612 (E.D. Wis. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
129 Levin v. Greco, 415 B.R. 663, 667 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
130 Id. at 664–65.
131 Id. at 666 (citing In re Rios, 901 F.2d 71, 72 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding attorney’s fees excepted from
discharge under § 523(a)(5) even though attorneys not listed as payees)).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 667 (“Some courts have assumed that if the debt is not paid by the debtor, the creditor could
collect from the spouse, and thus a payment to the creditor is indirectly a payment to the spouse. Other
decisions have stated that ‘the emphasis [should be] placed on the determination of whether a debt is in the
nature of support, rather than on the identity of the payee.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995))).
134 In re Miller, 55 F.3d at 1490 (10th Cir. 1995), cited in Levin, 415 B.R. at 667.
135 Levin, 415 B.R. at 667 (citing Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981)).
136 Id. (citing In re Miller, 55 F.3d at 1490).
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approach) and agreed that the nature of support is the only necessary
requirement under § 523(a)(5).137
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit adds to the
considerable list of courts following the idea that, even post-BAPCPA, support
is the only element of the statute that matters in determining
dischargeability.138 In In re Kennedy, it ruled that debts for child support and
attorney’s fees incurred in connection with divorce proceedings were
nondischargeable as domestic support obligations.139 After listing the four
separate requirements for domestic support obligations under § 101(14A), the
court held that “the record sufficiently shows that those debts met the
requirements for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(5) without further
inquiry.”140 The panel did not discuss whether the attorney’s fees met the
payee requirement of the statute.141 The panel simply determined that both the
attorney’s fees and child support debts were support and, thus,
nondischargeable.142
In re Blackwell involved a debt for attorney’s fees awarded by the state to
the debtor’s wife, in connection with actions taken by the wife to compel her
ex-husband to pay his divorce-related, court-ordered fees.143 The court noted
that although the Code defines domestic support obligations, it does not
address issues arising specifically from attorney’s fees.144 The court asserted
that it did not matter to whom the debt was owed, stating that “there is no
change in the legal character of the award just because, under the statute, the
award is now made directly to the former wife’s attorney and not to the former
wife.”145 The court invoked the long-standing idea that dischargeability is
dependent on whether the debt is in the nature of support or alimony.146 It went
on to find that “the fact the award is made to an attorney is no longer
relevant[,] and it is now well established that there is no impediment to assert a
claim of nondischargeability just because the attorney fee award was made

137

See id. at 666–67.
Kennedy v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), BAP No. AZ-09-1035-JuPaDu, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3169, at
*18–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2010).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See id.
142 Id. at *19.
143 Coleman v. Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 859–60 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010).
144 Id. at 862.
145 Id.
146 Id.
138
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directly to the attorney and not to the former spouse.”147 In essence, the debt
would be nondischargeable regardless of whether the payee was the former
spouse or the attorneys representing her. In support of this conclusion, the
court cited In re Strickland, a 1996 Eleventh Circuit case in which the court did
not discuss the payee requirement.148
These cases all provide examples of courts that have continued to decide
§ 523(a)(5) cases based on the nature of the debt alone. Although their
methods of analysis differ slightly, they all remain true to the same mantra: all
that matters is that the nature of the debt is support.
C. Courts Continuing to Consider § 523(a)(5)’s Payee Requirement Under
the Exception to the Plain Meaning Rule
The judicial exception to § 523(a)(5) prior to 2005 continues to influence
decisions.149 These courts adhere to the plain meaning of the payee
requirement, but they carve out an exception for debts that are support
obligations initially owed to a party other than any of the listed payees that
would ultimately remain a statutory payee’s responsibility if discharged by the
court.150
In In re Johnson, the court embraced the limited exception that looks to
whether the debtor’s spouse or child is potentially liable if the court were to
discharge the debt.151 Mr. Johnson claimed responsibility for a joint, or “hold
harmless,”152 debt to Wachovia Bank in his divorce proceedings with his exwife.153 When he declared bankruptcy, his ex-wife attempted to categorize this
Wachovia debt as a nondischargeable domestic support obligation.154 Finding

147

Id. (citing Brown v. Brown (In re Brown), 177 B.R. 116, 117 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); Aughenbaugh
v. Aughenbaugh (In re Aughenbaugh), 119 B.R. 861, 863–64 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)).
148 Id. at 862–63 (citing Strickland v. Shannon (In re Strickland), 90 F.3d 444, 446–47 (11th Cir. 1996)).
149 See In re Andrews, 434 B.R. 541, 546–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010); In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 289, 296
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008).
150 See, e.g., In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 546–48; In re Johnson, 397 B.R. at 296.
151 See In re Johnson, 397 B.R. at 295–96.
152 “Hold harmless” agreements—otherwise known as indemnity clauses—are essentially agreements in
which one party promises to remain responsible for a debt owed to a third party and vows to hold the
counterparty harmless for that debt. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 837–38 (9th ed. 2009). For example, a
spouse could agree to pay her ex-spouse’s mortgage payments and would assume responsibility for those
payments.
153 In re Johnson, 397 B.R. at 293.
154 Id. at 294.
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Mr. Johnson responsible for a nondischargeable domestic support obligation,
the court reasoned that
[t]he debt would be recoverable from [the ex-wife] or Mr. Johnson if
Mr. Johnson did not pay. Due to the language in the Separation
Agreement by which Mr. Johnson agreed to hold her harmless, if [the
ex-wife] were forced to pay the Wachovia [d]ebt, then Mr. Johnson
would be liable to [the ex-wife]. Thus, the Wachovia [d]ebt is owed
155
to or recoverable by [the ex-wife].

Because the debtor’s ex-wife would be liable for the debt if it were discharged,
the court considered this debt to fall within the limited exception to the payee
requirement.156
In the Eighth Circuit, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Arkansas decided In re Andrews using the limited exception.157 In that case,
the debtor was burdened with his ex-wife’s attorney’s fees following their
divorce.158 The attorney of the debtor’s ex-wife sought to declare the debt a
priority claim under § 507.159 The case revolved around interpreting the same
definition of “domestic support obligation” as the one in § 523(a)(5) and
necessitated the same support-and-payee analysis.160 Embracing the pre-2005
Amendment case law regarding the payee requirement,161 the court explained
that those amendments did not alter the statute enough to depart from
precedent, even as the court categorized the holding of In re Kline, the Eighth
Circuit precedent, a bit differently.162 Finding that the debt was
nondischargeable although owed to the attorney and her law firm, the court
explained,

155

Id. at 296.
See id.
157 See In re Andrews, 434 B.R. 541, 546–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010).
158 Id. at 544.
159 Id. at 543.
160 See id. at 545 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2006) (assigning first priority to “[a]llowed unsecured
claims for domestic support obligations that, as of the date of the filing of the petition . . . are owed to or
recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor”)).
161 Id. at 546–47.
162 In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 547–48 (discussing Holliday v. Kline (In re Kline), 65 F.3d 749, 750–51
(8th Cir. 1995)). The Kline court mentioned briefly that the debtor’s spouse might be liable for the obligation if
the court decided to discharge it, but the Andrews court placed much more emphasis on the fact that the
debtor’s ex-wife would be responsible for the attorney’s fees, were they to be discharged. Compare In re
Kline, 65 F.3d at 751, with In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 547–50. For this reason, Kline is listed with the preBAPCPA cases as one that follows the majority rule, and Andrews is grouped with post-BAPCPA cases
decided pursuant to the limited exception.
156
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In Gentilini [a post-BAPCPA decision analyzing In re Kline], the
court reasoned that the Kline court equated the attorney’s right to
payment from the debtor with the former spouse’s right to payment
from the debtor, provided that if the debtor were allowed to discharge
the debt, the former spouse would be liable for the debt to the third
party. . . . The [Gentilini] court concluded that the statute’s
requirement that the obligation be owed to a named entity can be
satisfied, as in Kline, “when the obligation is payable directly to a
third party, typically a professional who provided services to benefit
the wife or child, but only if the former spouse is also obligated for
163
the fees.”

Here, the court interpreted the divorce decrees and other court documents to
make the ex-spouse liable for payment of the attorney’s fees if the bankruptcy
court did not hold the debtor liable for them.164 This decision is therefore
representative of the rationale embraced by those courts carving out a limited
exception to the plain meaning rule for debts that become the responsibility of
the ex-spouse or child if the debtor is able to discharge them.165
III. A SOLUTION TO COURTS’ DISUNITY IN APPLYING § 523(A)(5)’S PAYEE
REQUIREMENT
A. Section 523(a)(5)’s Legislative History, Policy Background, and 2005
Alterations Support Courts Following the Exception to the Plain Meaning
Rule
The Comment turns now to the changes made by BAPCPA to family
support obligations and the legislative history behind § 523(a)(5). This
legislative history began with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which
codified in § 523(a)(5) the exception to discharge for support obligations, and
continues through the 2005 Amendments and their rearrangement of the
statutory language.166 The Comment then considers the policies underlying
congressional support for, and protection of, domestic support obligations.

163 In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 547–48 (discussing Simon, Schindler & Sandberg, LLP v. Gentilini (In re
Gentilini), 365 B.R. 251, 255–56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007)).
164 See id. at 546–48.
165 Id.
166 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 211, 215,
119 Stat. 23, 50–51, 54 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5) (2006)); Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)).
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1. Interpreting BAPCPA’s Changes to the Language and Structure of
§ 523(a)(5)
In 2005, Congress significantly altered the language and configuration of
§ 523(a)(5).167 Originally, the 1978 codification of § 523(a)(5) excepted a debt
owed:
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection
with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement
agreement, but not to the extent that—(A) such debt is assigned to
another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; or (B)
such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or
support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
168
maintenance, or support . . . .

In 1981 and 1984, Congress amended this subsection to make it more
favorable to government entities.169 The first change added the phrase “other
than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act”
to the end of § 523(a)(5)(A).170 This addition made certain obligations
nondischargeable if specifically assigned and created the first assignment
exception in this Code section.171 Then, Congress added another provision that
allowed exception for a much broader category of government entities.172 The
new provision altered § 523(a)(5) by:
(1) amending the first paragraph thereof by inserting the words “or
other order of a court of record” after the words “divorce decree,”;
and (2) inserting “, or any such debt which has been assigned to the
Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such
173
State” after “Social Security Act.”

167

See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act §§ 211, 215.
Bankruptcy Reform Act § 101.
169 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 454(b), 98
Stat. 333, 376 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2334(b), 95 Stat. 357, 863 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)).
170 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 2334(b).
171 Id.
172 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act § 454(b).
173 Id.
168
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These are just two examples of the numerous times Congress altered and
expanded the requirements and categories of nondischargeable debts under the
family support obligation section.174
In 2005, Congress made additional alterations.175 It shifted the § 523(a)(5)
language to § 101(14A), moving the definition of domestic support
obligation.176 Section 523(a)(5) was rewritten to except domestic support
obligations from discharge.177 When Congress moved the § 523(a)(5) language
to § 101(14A), it also altered its format and changed the structure of the payee
requirement.178
There are several major differences between the new § 101(14A) definition
and the pre-2005 § 523(a)(5) language that inspired it.179 The new definition is
broader than it was previously.180 Instead of excepting only obligations arising
out of a separation agreement, divorce decree, other court order, state law
determination, or property settlement established prior to the beginning of the
bankruptcy case, § 101(14A) excepts obligations that are established after the
order for relief as well.181 This change expands the time during which these
debts can be established—debts that are established both before and after the
date of the order of relief can be declared nondischargeable—and, therefore,
increases the category of debts excepted from discharge.182 Additionally,
Congress broadened § 101(14A) to include in the payee section debts owed to
governmental units and to the legal guardian or the responsible relative of the
debtor’s child, while a strict reading of pre-2005 § 523(a)(5) might not have
included these groups.183
Most importantly, Congress altered the structure of the exception from a
paragraph with two obvious requirements to a list of four elements that outline

174 See also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§§ 211, 215, 119 Stat. 23, 50–51, 54 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5)); Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)).
175 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act §§ 211, 215.
176 Id.
177 Id. § 215.
178 Id. §§ 211, 215.
179 See 2 COLLIER, supra note 19, ¶ 101.14A; 4 id. ¶ 523.11[3].
180 4 id. ¶ 523.11[3].
181 Id. ¶ 523.11 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006)).
182 See id.
183 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act §§ 211, 215; 2 COLLIER, supra note 19,
¶ 101.14A.
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the separate prerequisites for making the debt nondischargeable.184 Those four
prerequisites are that the debt: be paid to a listed payee; be in the nature of
support, maintenance, or alimony; be established in a separation or divorce
agreement, court order, or the determination under nonbankruptcy law of a
governmental unit; and cannot be assigned to nongovernmental entities except
under limited circumstances.185 This remodeled structure outlines the domestic
support obligation requirements more distinctly,186 while the addition of
certain language allows courts to declare additional categories of debts
nondischargeable.187
While the legislative reports from the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 acknowledged the alterations to § 523(a)(5)
and the new § 101(14A), the House Report accompanying BAPCPA did not
address or explain the significance of Congress’s rearrangement of the
elements.188 Courts have interpreted the 2005 Amendments as evidence that
the payee requirement is not only a distinct condition, but also a condition
weighed equally with the statutory requirement that the debt be in the nature of
support.189 Stated another way, Congress’s conscious restructuring and
amendment of the section may indicate its disagreement with the courts’ prior
interpretations of § 523(a)(5).
On the other hand, Congress’s failure to amend the essential language of
the payee requirement, and the lack of legislative statements surrounding the
2005 Amendments to the domestic support obligation exception, could imply
that Congress either ratified the actions of courts prior to the 2005
Amendments190 or had no knowledge of these judicial decisions.

184

See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).
Id.; see also Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 381 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (noting that the format of the new
§ 101(14A) is different and “sets out in a separate labeled subsections the requirements as to who[m] the debt
is owed”).
186 See Tucker, 423 B.R. at 381.
187 See 2 COLLIER, supra note 19, ¶ 101.14A; 4 id. ¶ 523.11[3].
188 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 16–17, 42–43, 59, 61 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
102–03, 114, 129, 131.
189 See Tucker, 423 B.R. at 381.
190 See Matthew Baker, Comment, The Sound of Congressional Silence: Judicial Distortion of the
Legislative–Executive Balance of Power, 2009 BYU L. REV. 225, 231 (“Broadly speaking, the judicial doctrine
of congressional acquiescence states that Congress can impliedly authorize presidential actions or judicial
interpretations by failing over time to signal disagreement or opposition.”).
185
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Congress amended § 523 twelve times between 1978 and 2005.191
Congress had ample opportunity to specify additional parties to which a
domestic support obligation could be assigned or paid. However, Congress
limited the expansion of the payee requirement to certain family members, the
responsible caregivers for the debtor’s children, and governmental entities.192
Significantly, Congress did not alter the list of payees or assignees to include
law firms, attorneys, guardians ad litem, or any number of third parties who
frequently try to claim nondischargeability under § 523(a)(5).193 Thus,
Congress’s failure to add language allowing these third-party payees to declare
debts owed to them nondischargeable is likely deliberate. The fact that
Congress has kept language in § 523(a)(5) fairly consistent through the
numerous amendments to the Code indicates that Congress did not find error in
courts’ interpretation through the years.194 Because the courts continue to
interpret the § 523(a)(5) language in a variety of ways, however, it is difficult
to tell which interpretations congressional inaction implicitly approved.195
Without any clear indication from Congress either way, trying to discern what
its actions truly mean is a perilous task.
2. Section 523(a)(5)’s Legislative History
The House and Senate Reports accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 support the idea that Congress intended § 523(a)(5) only to apply to
debts owed directly to a spouse, former spouse, or child, subject to one
exception.196 The Senate Report explained that the exception did not apply to
debts assigned to another entity.197 However, the Senate Report noted that if
the debtor assumed a spouse or ex-spouse’s debt to a third party, that debt was

191

See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) amendments.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A) (2006) (listing parties explicitly covered by the payee requirement).
193 Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006)).
194 See Baker, supra note 190, at 231.
195 Compare Madden v. Staggs (In re Staggs), 203 B.R. 712, 717–19 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996)
(disregarding the payee requirement while finding a debt to be a nondischargeable domestic support
obligation), with Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 10–11 (2d Cir. 1981) (carving out a very narrow
exception and looking to the individual with ultimate responsibility for the debt in determining
nondischargeability).
196 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2594, 2591 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006)); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5865; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320.
197 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79.
192
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also nondischargeable as long as it was also categorized as being in the nature
of alimony, maintenance, or support.198
The House Report also explained that the language “will apply to make
nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly to a
spouse or dependent,”199 yet the report similarly noted that “[t]his
provision . . . . make[s] nondischargeable any debts resulting from an
agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor’s spouse harmless on joint debts, to
the extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or
support of the spouse.”200
Thus, Congress consistently has asserted that when the debt is payable only
to a spouse, former spouse, or child, it is excepted from discharge. However,
both the House and Senate Reports indicate that hold harmless obligations—
those assumed by the debtor and owed to a third party—are also eligible for
nondischargeability.201 Thus, the judicially created exception to the plain
meaning rule would best accomplish the ends that Congress envisioned in
1978, even though some of the language within the legislative history might
foreclose the possibility that courts could consider anything but the plain
meaning of the payee requirement.
In In re Brooks, the court inferred from the 1994 Congressional Record that
Congress did not intend § 523(a) to provide aid for law firms when it noted:
“The [§ 523(a)(15)] exception [to discharge] applies only to debts incurred in a
divorce or separation that are owed to a spouse or former spouse, and can be
asserted only by the other party to the divorce or separation . . . .”202 Although
this statement applies to § 523(a)(15), the pertinent language—“to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor”—is the same as that originally in
§ 523(a)(5) and can illuminate the congressional intent behind § 523(a)(5).203
This would suggest that the payee language applies literally to only those
individuals as they are the only parties who may assert these discharge
exceptions. However, the possibility exists that a spouse, former spouse, or

198

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364.
200 Id.
201 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364; see also 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Edwards).
202 Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R. 761,
766 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. H10,770 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1994) (statement by Rep. Brooks)).
203 Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006)).
199
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child could attempt to declare nondischargeable a hold harmless agreement
under which the debtor had agreed to assume responsibility for the obligation.
Because such an attempt would still be an adversary action by a listed payee,
these types of debts potentially fit within the confines of the statutory
language, and the judicially created exception accomplishes what Congress
intended.
The 2005 House Judiciary Committee Report provided a comprehensive
discussion of the 2005 Amendments,204 but the Committee neglected to
comment extensively on the specific changes to §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A).205
The Report acknowledged that § 101(14A) greatly expanded and made
uniform the spectrum of domestic support obligations and briefly discussed the
changes intended to enforce families’ rights and protections.206 The Committee
discussed the enhancement of states’ rights and priorities regarding domestic
support obligations and emphasized that the state would be able to collect
those obligations more easily.207 However, the Report neither admonishes the
courts nor addresses the trend of court decisions largely ignoring the statute’s
payee requirement.208 Perhaps Congress did not wish to contradict the majority
of case law, and perhaps lack of attention to the jurisprudence supports that
contention.209 It remains, though, that the legislative history accompanying the
2005 Amendments lends no insight to how courts should interpret the domestic
support obligation payee requirement.
3. The Policy Motivations that Separate § 523(a)(5) from the Rest of the
Bankruptcy Code
Generally, a consistent set of fundamental policies guides the Code. Most
importantly, Congress designed the Code to give honest and unfortunate
debtors a fresh start.210 Therefore, courts understand that “[e]xceptions to
204 Generally, Congress designed the 2005 Amendments to combat bankruptcy fraud, and make it harder
for debtors to file, while attempting to protect the creditors’ interests. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 15
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 101–02. Notably, the House Committee Report does not provide
any interpretation of the domestic support obligation language or discuss any cases that address the payee
requirement. See id. at 16–17, 42–43, 52–53, 59–62, 84, 95 (listing all instances where the “domestic support
obligation” is discussed).
205 See id. at 16–17.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 17, 42–43.
208 See id. at 16–17, 42–43, 59–62.
209 See supra text accompanying note 190.
210 Levin v. Greco, 415 B.R. 663, 665 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549
U.S. 365, 367 (2007)).
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discharge are generally construed strictly against a creditor and liberally in
favor of the debtor.”211
Courts have interpreted domestic support obligations and their predecessor,
family support obligations, using individualized policy considerations. Courts
are cognizant of both these policies and Congress’s desire that “genuine
support obligations would not be discharged.”212 Courts interpret § 523(a)(5)
as demonstrating a policy preference for the protection of the debtor’s spouse
and children and assurances that they are provided for throughout and after the
debtor’s bankruptcy.213 It is therefore necessary that courts construe
§ 523(a)(5) more liberally than the other § 523 exceptions.214 Congress’s intent
to protect the often-vulnerable family members—namely, the debtor’s spouse
and children—is evident through its deviation from the usual discharge
exception policies and rules.215 Protecting attorneys, banks, and courtappointed professionals, however, would not further this goal; the more liberal
policies are limited in their application to family members or other § 523(a)(5)
listed payees.216
B. Interpreting § 523(a)(5) Using Canons of Construction, Legislative
History, and Policy Considerations
As previously mentioned, § 523(a)(5) excepts domestic support
obligations, and § 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations.217 Although
§ 523(a)(5) makes domestic support obligation debts nondischargeable based
on four separate elements, most courts functionally ignore the requirement that
those debts only be owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor.218 Family support obligations have long existed in the Code

211

Id. (citing Goldberg Secs., Inc. v. Scarlata (In re Scarlata), 979 F.2d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 380 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (quoting Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 9 F.3d
878, 880 (10th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213 Levin, 415 B.R. at 665 (citing In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881–82 (7th Cir. 1998)).
214 Id. (citing In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d at 881–82).
215 Id. (citing In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d at 881–82).
216 See Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R.
761, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (“Congress intended in [§] 523(a)(5) to ensure the support of a debtor’s
family, not to turn a debtor’s family members into debt recovery associates. This is evidenced by the words of
the defined term itself: ‘a domestic support obligation.’”).
217 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5) (2006).
218 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), BAP No. AZ-09-1035-JuPaDu, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS
3169, at *18–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2010); Prensky v. Clair Greifer LLP, No. 09-6200 (FLW), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66181, at *24–27 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010); Levin, 415 B.R. at 666–67; Coleman v. Blackwell (In
212
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and case law, but the reach of the exception must be tailored and limited in
order to balance the policies favoring protection of a debtor’s dependents and
those authorizing a fresh start for the debtor.219 The solution this Comment
recommends in this section considers and promotes the meaning, purpose, and
policies of § 523(a)(5).
1. A Procedural Formula To Determine Whether a Debt Is a Domestic
Support Obligation
The process of determining whether a debt is a domestic support obligation
should follow a specific formula. First, the court should determine whether the
debt should be characterized as a domestic support obligation or as a
§ 523(a)(15) property settlement. This determination is especially important
for debtors who have filed chapter 13 petitions as the distinction means the
difference between dischargeability and nondischargeability.220 Debts falling
under § 523(a)(15) are dischargeable in chapter 13.221 This area of law has
historically been the subject of considerable debate, as there has been great
variance in the approaches courts use to distinguish between the two types of
debts.222 Perhaps only a declaration by Congress or the Supreme Court will
clear up the confusion regarding the difference between § 523(a)(5) and
§ 523(a)(15) and the method courts should use to distinguish the two.
Once a court decides that the debt is in the nature of support and is
potentially a domestic support obligation under § 523(a)(5), it must still
evaluate the three other requirements contained in § 101(14A).223 It is not
enough that the debt is simply one of support; it must also be: (a) owed to or
recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, child of the debtor, the child’s
caretakers, or a governmental entity; (b) established or subject to establishment
within a divorce or separation decree, court order, or other governmental

re Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 862–63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Rose, No. 08-30051, 2008 WL 4205364,
at *3–9 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2008); see also supra Part II.B.
219 See supra Part III.A.3.
220 NORTON, supra note 26, § 57:35, at 57-100 (“Obligations arise between spouses, particularly former
spouses, as a result of loans, as a means of adjusting a division of property, and often as a means of
discharging the duty of support. Originally, debts traceable to loans and to property divisions were not
excepted from the debtor’s discharged debts. After amendments in 1994 and 2005, however, such property
settlement obligations were excepted from discharge in all cases other than [c]hapter 13. Debts traceable to
support are not dischargeable in any chapter under the Bankruptcy Code.”).
221 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2).
222 See supra Part I.A.; see also Austin, supra note 32, at 1393–1416.
223 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A)(A), (C)–(D), 523(a)(5).
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determination before, on, or after the order of relief; and (c) notwithstanding
certain exceptions, not assigned to a nongovernmental entity.224 If the court
determines that the debt is indeed owed to one of the listed payees, and it
fulfills the remaining two requirements, the court should declare the debt
nondischargeable.
If, however, the debt is not payable directly to one of the listed payees, the
court should determine then whether the debt fits under the judicially created
exception to the payee requirement.225 Under this exception, if a separation or
divorce agreement contains a hold harmless provision, or if the non-debtor
spouse or child would be responsible for payment if the obligation were
ultimately discharged, the court would find the debt to be a domestic support
obligation and, therefore, nondischargeable.226 Because the debt is not owed
directly to a statutorily listed payee, this approach would require that the court
analyze the debt and inquire into the parties involved for the purpose of
determining who, if anyone, would be responsible for the debt if it were
discharged. This formula differs from the current majority practice in that it
goes beyond a simple determination of the nature of the debt.227 It also takes
into account the plain language of the statute while remaining true to the
congressional intent and policy behind § 523(a)(5).228
2. What Result if Courts Followed the Plain Meaning of the Payee
Requirement?
At first glance, restricting nondischargeability specifically to debts payable
only to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor seems to comport both
with the policy and legislative history of the statute. Hypothetically, courts
would adhere strictly to a plain language reading of the domestic support
224

See id. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5).
See In re Andrews, 434 B.R. 541, 547–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010); In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 289, 299
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008).
226 See In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 547–48 (following the judicially created exception in interpreting
§ 523(a)(5)’s payee requirement); In re Johnson, 397 B.R. at 296, 298–99 (evaluating the dischargeability of
the debt in question according to who would be ultimately responsible for the debt if the debt was not declared
a domestic support obligation).
227 Contra Kassicieh v. Battisti (In re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 476–77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); see also
Kennedy v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), BAP No. AZ-09-1035-JuPaDu, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3169, at *18–19
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2010); Prensky v. Clair Greifer LLP, No. 09-6200 (FLW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66181, at *24–27 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010); Levin v. Greco, 415 B.R. 663, 666–67 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Coleman v.
Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 862 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Rose, No. 08-30051, 2008 WL
4205364, at *3–10 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2008).
228 See supra Part III.A.
225
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obligation elements, particularly the payee requirement, which means that
courts would deem only those debts that are actually payable to or recoverable
by the statutorily listed recipients as domestic support obligations. This “plain
meaning” approach would necessarily reject both the majority method, in
which courts allow the nature of the debt to control, and the limited judicial
exception presently followed by only a few courts.229 Tucker v. Oliver and In
re Brooks, in which attorney’s fees incurred in the course of divorce or custody
proceedings were declared dischargeable because the debts did not meet the
payee requirement, would be the standard.230 Those courts asserted not only
that they should follow the plain and obvious language of §§ 523(a)(5) and
101(14A), but also that the changes to the Code in the 2005 Amendments
altered the statutory section enough that pre-2005 case law was not binding
precedent.231 Admittedly, the requirement that the debt be payable only to the
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor is not new to §§ 523(a)(5) and
101(14A); it was contained in the pre-2005 version of § 523(a)(5).232 However,
these courts believe that Congress may have deliberately reformatted the
statutory section into the new § 101(14A) to stress that there are four separate,
distinct, and strict requirements for a nondischargeable domestic support
obligation.233 One of those elements is the payee requirement.
In Kelly v. Robinson, the Supreme Court mandated that when construing a
statute, the first step is to look to the plain language of the statute, stating, “the
‘starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself.’ But the text is only the starting point.”234 The Court therefore calls for a
multidimensional approach to statutory construction—analyzing language,
purposes, and policies and using certain canons of construction—that begins
with the language itself.235 Courts and scholars have embraced this seemingly
holistic method of interpreting and applying BAPCPA by first assessing the
plain meaning of the language and, in some cases, continuing with an analysis

229 See Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 381–82 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher,
Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R. 761, 763–65, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
230 See Tucker, 423 B.R. at 381–82; In re Brooks, 371 B.R. at 763–65, 768.
231 Tucker, 423 B.R. at 381–82; In re Brooks, 371 B.R. at 763–65, 768.
232 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2000).
233 Tucker, 423 B.R. at 381–82; In re Brooks, 371 B.R. at 763–65, 768.
234 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
235 Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
349, 351 (2008).
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of congressional intent and a variety of canons of construction to gain more
insight into the likely meaning of the statute.236
The Supreme Court has previously considered other sections of the Code
under a plain meaning analysis.237 This doctrine embodies the idea that the
written language of the statute alone demonstrates congressional intent.238 This
interpretation
demands
that
an
unambiguous
statute
be
239
“enforce[d] . . . according to its terms.”
Determining a statute’s plain
meaning is the default rule when engaging in statutory construction.240 But if
the plain meaning of the language remains uncertain, courts are to proceed
with other methods of statutory construction.241
The relevant text is § 523(a)(5)’s requirement that to be nondischargeable,
the debt must be “owed to or recoverable by . . . a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor . . . or a governmental unit.”242 Arguably, within normal
usage and meaning, the words “owed to” and “recoverable by” indicate an
exclusive list of individuals to whom the debtor must be directly responsible.
At the very least, when paired with a discrete list of payees (spouse, former
spouse, child, or governmental entity), those terms do not reflect the idea that
individuals or entities other than those listed in the statute can be eligible for a
determination of nondischargeability as holding a domestic support obligation.
According to Webster’s Dictionary, the definition of “owe” is “to have or bear
(an emotion or attitude) to someone or something” or “to be indebted to.”243
The commonality between these definitions is that they require someone or
something to whom a debt or obligation is owed. Congress filled that need by

236 Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial
Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 210–14 (2007) (stating that the principles
when assessing congressional intent include the following canons: avoiding surplusage, practice under the
prior version of the statute, neologisms, comparison with other sections, unforeseen consequences, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, and legislative history).
237 Alan R. Lepene & Sean A. Gordon, The Case for Derivative Standing in Chapter 11: “It’s the Plain
Meaning, Stupid,” 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 313, 313–14 (2003).
238 Id. at 313.
239 Id. at 313–14 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
240 Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 211–12 (noting that the “default approach” to evaluating
congressional intent in statutory interpretation is the plain meaning rule).
241 Id. at 212–13.
242 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A)(A), 523(a)(5) (2006).
243 Owe Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/owe (last
visited Jan. 13, 2012).
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listing the payees to whom they felt a domestic support obligation should be
owed.
Similarly, the dictionary defines “recover” as “to get back” or “to gain by
legal process.”244 This interpretation also hints that an entity or individual must
be eligible to get back or gain through legal process that which it lost or is
owed.245 Again, Congress addressed this need in the language of § 101(14A),
outlining the four requirements for a domestic support obligation.246 Therefore,
the plain language of the statute and the reasonably foreseeable repercussions
of its literal interpretation would lead to the belief that courts should strictly
follow this text. Section 101(14A) is not an ambiguous statement. Rather,
§ 101(14A) contains common and easily defined words that are placed
logically together to form a requirement that may seem intuitive when dealing
with obligations that are in the nature of family support: the debt must provide
for a family member or former family member. This analysis would be in line
with recent cases in which courts have ruled based on the plain meaning of
§ 523(a)(5)’s payee requirement.247
3. Solving the § 523(a)(5) Payee Problem Requires Courts To Follow the
Exception to the Plain Meaning Interpretation
Although the preceding analysis may lead to the conclusion that one should
plainly construe § 523(a)(5)’s payee requirement, there are recent developing
trends in statutory interpretation which must be considered. The “holistic”
approach mentioned above from Kelly has evolved further in recent Supreme
Court decisions.248 Eschewing the plain meaning approach in 2007, the Court
decided Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts by forgoing an exclusive
focus on the language of the Code and placing a greater emphasis on the
purposes and policy to guide interpretation.249 This and other recent decisions
244 Recover Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recover
(last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
245 But see Austin, supra note 32, at 1392 (“[D]ebts that are ‘owed to’ a spouse or child are debts so
designated in an agreement or decree as payable to that person. Debts ‘recoverable by’ a spouse or child are
debts that, through state court legal process, the creditor spouse or child could enforce.”).
246 Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R. 761,
768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
247 See Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 381–82 (W.D. Okla. 2010); In re Brooks, 371 B.R. at 763–65,
768.
248 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 371–76 (2007) (focusing on policy and
legislative purpose in allowing the lower courts to deny a bad faith debtor the right to convert a chapter 7 case
to another chapter).
249 Braucher, supra note 235, at 350.
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instruct lower courts that they should de-emphasize their reliance on the plain
meaning of the language in the Code and focus instead on “purposes and
policy as the primary basis of interpretation.”250 One can view the Supreme
Court’s statements as a mandate to interpret the Code in such a way that
reconciles the policy, purpose, and language of the statute.251
Because of this Supreme Court decision and the developing trend moving
away from “plain meaning,”252 the “plain meaning” should not be the stopping
point in determining how to apply the Code (and § 523(a)(5) specifically).
Supporting this idea is the fact that although the plain language of the payee
requirement seems easy to interpret, courts struggle when applying it.253
Therefore, an analysis beyond the “plain meaning” is necessary to develop a
comprehensive solution to the confusion.
In an effort to embrace the previously mentioned “holistic” method of
statutory interpretation and in combination with this recent Supreme Court
instruction, this Comment next considers certain factors and canons of
construction in interpreting the payee requirement, with special emphasis on
the purpose and policy behind § 523(a)(5).254
a. Analyzing the Factors Outlined in Supreme Court Cases
The canons of construction discussed in this section lend support to
conflicting theories of interpretation. Some of the canons would counsel courts
simply to apply the plain meaning, and others would support the idea that the
plain meaning is not the correct way to apply § 523(a)(5). While reviewing
each interpretive principle, it is important to keep in mind that the Supreme
Court recently placed considerable emphasis on evaluating the legislative
purpose and the policy behind the statutory section.255 This Comment will
discuss the canon of surplusage, courts’ practice under prior versions of the
statute, neologisms, the effect of certain interpretations on other Code sections,
unforeseen consequences of certain interpretations, the canon expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, and the legislative history surrounding the payee
requirement.
250

See id. at 350 & n.10.
See id.
252 See id. at 350–51.
253 See supra Parts I–II.
254 See Braucher, supra note 235, at 350; Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 210–14.
255 See Braucher, supra note 235, at 350; see also Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 371–
75 (2007).
251
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First, the canon of surplusage recognizes that courts may decline to
acknowledge certain words in the statute if they were “inadvertently inserted or
[would be] repugnant to the rest of the statute.”256 In Lamie v. United States
Trustee, the Supreme Court used the concept of surplusage to provide support
for its decision.257 In that case, the Court explained that, although attorneys
were listed as possible payees under § 330(a), they were also encompassed as
“professional persons” in the statute.258 The approach the Court ultimately took
in interpreting § 330(a) meant that listing both “attorneys” and “professional
persons” as possible payees was surplusage.259 The Court noted that, although
not the death knell of a court’s interpretation, courts usually seek to avoid
interpreting statutes in a way that would produce surplusage.260
Reading the plain language of §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A) would not result
in surplusage. Courts would not have to ignore any words in the statute. The
list of payees (“spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor . . . or
governmental entity”) does not overlap with any other statutory list of payees
for domestic support obligations, and there are no overlaps within the domestic
support obligation definition.261 The plain language does not render any of the
listed payees superfluous. Therefore, courts would not need to worry about
surplusage if they plainly interpret the domestic support obligation requirement
from §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A).
The next factor that the Supreme Court has considered in construing the
Code is the practice of courts under prior versions of the statute.262 As
discussed above, the vast majority of circuits essentially ignored the payee
requirement,263 even though it has been in the statute since the enactment of
the Code in 1978.264 Concurrently, a few courts followed a judicially created

256

See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534,
U.S. 84, 94 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006) (providing the only definition for “domestic support obligation” in the
Code).
262 Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 212; see also Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444–50 (1999) (evaluating terms in the Code in light of their pre-Code
usage).
263 See supra Part I.B.1.
264 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2594, 2591 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)).
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exception prior to 2005.265 Courts using this exception evaluated certain debt
payments, such as the attorney’s fees in In re Spong, as de facto payments to
the former spouse.266 However, even with some courts following this
exception, it remains that, prior to 2005, most courts seemed to simply evaluate
whether the debt was in the nature of support and disregard the requirement
that, for nondischargeability, the debtor had to owe the debt to a payee listed in
§ 523(a)(5).267 If modern courts were to continue to disregard the payee
requirement in interpreting domestic support obligations, there would at least
be continuity with majority decisions prior to the 2005 Amendments.
Neologisms are also used by courts to interpret statutory language.268 A
neologism is a “new word, usage or expression.”269 The interpretative use of
neologisms involves a presumption that Congress acted intentionally when
omitting language it included in another section.270 The presumption is even
stronger when the omission involves the replacement of standard terminology
with a neologism.271 Every occurrence of domestic support obligations in the
Code invokes the same definition from § 101(14A), so there are no alternate
lists of payees for domestic support obligations and, thus, no neologisms to
analyze.272
When interpreting the Code, the Supreme Court also directs parties to
compare the questioned language with that in other sections.273 Justice Souter
noted that “[n]ormal rule[s] of statutory construction require that identical
words [used] in the same section of the same enactment must be given the
same effect” and the rules of construction mandate that a common term which
occurs multiple times within a statute must be defined in a single way.274 Every
time the Code mentions domestic support obligations, it incorporates the
definition of that phrase found in § 101(14A).275 However, the specific list of
265

See, e.g., Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1981).
See supra Part I.B.2.
267 See supra Part I.B.1.
268 Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 212 & n.79.
269 Neologism
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
neologism (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
270 Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 212 n.79.
271 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994).
272 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 523(a)(5) (2006); see also id. § 101(14A).
273 Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 212 & n.80.
274 Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. at 556–57 (Souter, J., dissenting) (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 422 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
275 See supra text accompanying note 261.
266
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designated payees occurs in three sections: §§ 101(14A), 507(a)(1), and
523(a)(15).276 Section 507(a)(1) is the priority section that encompasses the
domestic support obligation definition of § 101(14A) and assigns a priority to
“[a]llowed unsecured claims for domestic support obligations that, as of the
date of filing of the petition in a case under this title, are owed to or
recoverable by a spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor.”277 Section
523(a)(15) makes nondischargeable non-support debts arising out of support or
separation.278 Courts have interpreted these listed payees in §§ 507(a)(1) and
523(a)(15) the same way that they previously interpreted § 523(a)(5)—that the
payee requirement is not an essential element of the statute.279 For instance,
courts use decisions involving §§ 523(a)(5) and 507(a)(1) interchangeably in
their decision making when discussing the elements and requirements of
domestic support obligations.280 The rationales offered for declaring attorney’s
fees nondischargeable, regardless of the payee requirement, are
indistinguishable from those that courts use when considering the priority
status of similar fees under § 507(a)(1)(A).281
Furthermore, because all references to domestic support obligations in the
Code necessarily incorporate the payee language involved in § 101(14A)’s
definition of authorized payees, any conclusion regarding its application will
necessarily affect all of those sections. Returning to § 507(a)(1), it is therefore
appropriate to interpret the language in the nondischargeability section and the
language in the priority section in the same way.282 This is not difficult as the
priority section also strives to ensure that family members’ claims are afforded

276

11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 507(a)(1), 523(a)(5).
Id. § 507(a)(1)(A).
278 Id. § 523(a)(15).
279 Compare In re Andrews, 434 B.R. 541, 546–50 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010) (allowing a law firm to
collect nondischargeable priority payments as a domestic support obligation), In re Rose, No. 08-30051, 2008
WL 4205364, at *2–9 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2008) (allowing a guardian ad litem to recover fees as a
nondischargeable domestic support obligation under §§ 101(14A) and 507(a)(1)), and Clair, Griefer LLP v.
Prensky (In re Prensky), 416 B.R. 406, 409–12 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2009) (stating it was “immaterial that the debt
is payable to the [law firm]” and allowing it to recover its fees from a chapter 7 debtor as a nondischargeable
divorce-incurred debt under § 523(a)(15)), aff’d, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66181 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010), with
Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (allowing a guardian ad litem and child
psychologist to classify their fees as nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) because “the emphasis [is] placed on
the determination of whether a debt is in the nature of support, rather than on the identity of the payee”).
280 See, e.g., In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 546–50; In re Rose, 2008 WL 4205364, at *3–9.
281 See In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 546–50; In re Rose, 2008 WL 4205364, at *3–9.
282 See Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that because the
language of the two sections is identical, “application of § 507(a)(7) should be coincidental with application of
§ 523(a)(5)”).
277
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protection and precedence in bankruptcy, and their claims on the debtor’s
assets are therefore the most important.283 However, because the specific payee
language in the domestic support obligation definition appears so infrequently
in the Code, analyzing how Congress uses the language in question elsewhere
in the statute does not offer the most reliable analysis.
Construing § 523(a)(5) a certain way has the potential to lead to unwanted
consequences elsewhere in title 11. Numerous sections of the Code directly or
indirectly reference domestic support obligations and, through it,
§ 523(a)(5).284 Thus, the analysis of the payee requirement language in the
context of nondischargeability necessarily affects the other statutory sections
that incorporate § 101(14A). Some of the Code sections are simply related to
procedure, such as § 502(b)(5), which disallows claims for unmatured
domestic support obligations, and § 704(a)(10), which provides guidelines for
the notice that trustees must provide if the bankruptcy involves domestic
support obligations.285 Other sections are more substantive, including
§ 1129(a)(14), which mandates that plan confirmation require the debtor to pay
his domestic support obligations.286 This category also includes § 547(c)(7),
which limits the trustee’s avoidance powers to transfers that are payments of
domestic support obligations.287 Each statutory section within this
“substantive” category shares similar characteristics, in that each protects the
interests of the payee, and elevates domestic support obligations to positions of
importance.288
283

See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (elevating domestic support obligations to a higher priority than all other

debts).
284 See, e.g., id. §§ 101(14A), 362(b)(2)(A)–(C), 502(b)(5), 503(b)(1)(A)(ii), 507(a)(1)(A), 522(c)(1),
524(a)(3), 547(c)(7), 704(a)(10), 707(c)(3), 1106(a)(8), 1112(b)(4)(P), 1129(a)(14), 1141(d)(2), 1202(b)(6),
1208(c)(10), 1225(a)(7), 1228(a)(2), 1302(b)(6), 1307(c)(11), 1325(a)(8), 1328(a)(2).
285 See id. §§ 502(b)(5), 704(a)(10); see also id. §§ 503(b)(1)(A)(ii), 1106(c)(1)(C)(iv)(I), 1202(b)(6),
1302(b)(6).
286 Id. § 1129(a)(14).
287 Id. § 547(c)(7).
288 See id. § 362(b)(2)(A)–(C) (excepting from automatic stay the collection, establishment, or
modification of domestic support obligations); id. § 507(a)(1)(A) (affording domestic support obligations first
priority in payment of claims in reorganization); id. § 522(c)(1) (stating that property, even if exempt, is
subject to debts for domestic support obligations); id. § 524(a)(3) (not allowing discharge to enjoin domestic
support obligations accrued after commencement of action); id. § 707(c)(3) (providing that case cannot be
dismissed if it is necessary to satisfy claim for domestic support obligations); id. § 1112(b)(4)(P) (labeling
failure of debtor to pay domestic support obligations as cause for conversion or dismissal of chapter 11 plan);
id. § 1129(a)(14) (requiring payment of all past-due domestic support obligations before confirmation of
chapter 11 plan); id. § 1141(d)(2) (mandating that discharge of debts in an individual chapter 11 debtor does
not apply to any debts covered by § 523); id. § 1208(c)(1) (labeling failure of debtor to pay domestic support
obligations as cause for conversion or dismissal); id. § 1225(a)(7) (requiring payment of domestic support
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However one construes the domestic support obligation language, the
interpretation must be compatible with the intent behind these other sections.
In order to ensure uniformity within the Code, courts should embrace the same
approach and consistently interpret the domestic support obligation payee
language. Arguably, if all courts only followed the plain meaning, uniformity
would be achieved. To allow courts to manipulate the domestic support
obligation definition for the purposes of § 523(a)(5) would discourage uniform
interpretation of domestic support obligations throughout the Code. If courts
allowed entities other than spouses, former spouses, or children of the debtor to
hold nondischargeable domestic support obligations, it would cause potentially
unwanted repercussions in other Code sections.
When interpreting statutory language, courts also evaluate the potential
unforeseen external consequences of certain constructions of the language.289
In enacting § 523(a)(5), Congress surely did not intend for attorneys or
individuals other than family members to hold nondischargeable domestic
support obligations or occupy the top priority in payment. Under § 523(a)(5) as
generally applied, banks, guardians ad litem, and attorneys have been able to
use this statutory section to elevate their debts above those that are essentially
the same but not gained in connection with support issues.290 Preserving the
family and granting support-related debts a special status in bankruptcy are
long-respected and honored principles,291 but it seems to be an unfair mutation
for courts to allow those other than spouses, children, or former spouses to take
advantage of the § 523(a)(5) language. If Congress had intended to allow third
parties and outside entities access to the privileges afforded domestic support
obligations, it would have indicated so any of the numerous times it amended

obligations for confirmation of payment plan for reorganization); id. § 1228(a)(2) (decreeing that debts
covered by § 523 are nondischargeable through chapter 12 plans); id. § 1307(c)(11) (labeling failure of debtor
to pay domestic support obligations as cause for conversion or dismissal); id. § 1325(a)(8) (requiring payment
of domestic support obligations for confirmation of payment plan for reorganization); id. § 1328(a)(2)
(mandating that certain debts covered by § 523 are nondischargeable through chapter 13 plans).
289 See Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 212–13 & n.81.
290 See, e.g., Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1140–42 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding courtimposed guardian ad litem fees nondischargeable family support obligation deserving priority payment);
Gianakis v. Gianakis (In re Gianakis), 917 F.2d 759, 762–64 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding second mortgage
assumed by debtor to be nondischargeable family support obligation); Coleman v. Blackwell (In re
Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 858–63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (holding attorney’s fees payable directly to
attorney for post-divorce enforcement actions nondischargeable domestic support obligation).
291 See Austin, supra note 32, at 1384 (“Bankruptcy courts have long recognized marital and child support
obligations as a unique type of debt to be treated differently from other forms of secured debt due to the
vulnerability of former spouses and dependents.”).
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§ 523(a)(5).292 Additionally, the Code affords creditors protections
elsewhere,293 and courts should be forbidden from manipulating such a familycentric area of bankruptcy law to suit their needs. The policy motivations
behind § 523(a)(5) and domestic support obligations indicate that the purpose
of this language is to respect and protect family members and those who
require the debtor’s support.294 That list does not include banks, attorneys,
guardians ad litem, or any other third party that § 101(14A) does not name.295
The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius supports the proposition
that the courts should strictly and plainly interpret the domestic support
obligation language limiting nondischargeability to certain payees. It stands for
the proposition that “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of
the other, or the alternative.”296 Applying this premise, the fact that Congress
wrote an exclusive list of payees for domestic support obligations indicates that
it intended to exclude all others from that list. Therefore, because Congress
outlined specific eligible payees in both §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A),297 those
not clearly on the list are not eligible to have their debts declared
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5), even if owed a debt in the nature of
support.
The final factor that courts consider when interpreting the statutory
language of the Code is the legislative history.298 Except for a few minor
additions, the language of the § 523(a)(5) payee requirement has remained
fairly consistent since the original enactment in 1978.299 Because of this
consistency, the legislative history referring back to 1978 is relevant. In the
twelve times that Congress has amended § 523 since 1978, it has only

292

See supra text accompanying notes 191–93.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (allowing a party to seek a modification or termination of the automatic
stay for various reasons including a lack of adequate protection or when involving certain types of “scheme[s]
to delay, hinder, or defraud” creditors); id. § 1322(b)(2) (preventing debtors in chapter 13 from modifying
many terms of a mortgage on their home).
294 See supra Part III.A.3.
295 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A)(A), 523(a)(5); supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the policies accompanying
§ 523(a)(5)).
296 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 152, at 661.
297 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2000) (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5) (2006)).
298 See Waldron & Berman, supra note 236, at 213.
299 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006), with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006)).
293
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minimally expanded the list of payees in § 523(a)(5).300 The current list of
authorized payees under § 101(14A) includes “a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible
relative; or . . . a government unit.”301 Congress has therefore never expanded
the list of payees to include any number of the creditors that courts are
currently allowing to categorize their debts as domestic support obligations,
such as banks and law firms.302 However, except for the congressional remarks
accompanying the 1978 codification of the domestic support obligation
exception, Congress has not specifically overruled any case law, and it has not
criticized the courts’ decisions involving § 523(a)(5).303 Congressional silence
is often interpreted as an implicit ratification of courts’ decisions construing
statutory language.304 This idea creates a conundrum, as over the years courts
have interpreted this section in very different ways.305 So, if Congress is
silently ratifying the courts’ actions, which actions is it ratifying? Not everyone
in the legal world approves of interpreting congressional silence as anything
other than silence, so is it possible that Congress did not intend to ratify any of
these approaches to domestic support obligations?306 If this is true, potentially
because § 523(a)(5) is just a small section of bankruptcy law, it is conceivable
that Congress simply has not considered the case law surrounding this section
in any detail. Regardless of which possibility is true, reliance on any one of the
current judicial approaches alone should not dictate the interpretation of
§ 523(a)(5)’s language.

300 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006), with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006)).
301 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A) (2006).
302 Compare id. § 101(14A)(A) (failing to list banks, attorneys, guardians ad litem, or many other third
parties as allowed payees), with In re Rose, No. 08-30051, 2008 WL 4205364, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept.
10, 2008) (holding that fees of a guardian ad litem are nondischargeable domestic support obligations), and
Coleman v. Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 432 B.R. 856, 862–63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (holding attorney’s
fees directly payable to attorneys to be a nondischargeable domestic support obligation).
303 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 16–17, 42–43, 59, 61 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
102–03, 114, 129, 131; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320; 140 CONG. REC. 10,770 (1994)
(statement of Rep. Brooks).
304 Baker, supra note 190, at 231 (“Broadly speaking, the judicial doctrine of congressional acquiescence
states that Congress can impliedly authorize presidential actions or judicial interpretations by failing over time
to signal disagreement or opposition.”).
305 See Kassicieh v. Battisti (In re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 472–81 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
306 Baker, supra note 190, at 229 (“[P]ast Supreme Court justices have condemned reliance on
congressional silence as, in Justice Harlan’s words, ‘a poor beacon to follow.’” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396
U.S. 168, 185 (1969))).
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As discussed previously, the legislative history of the original § 523(a)(5)
codification in 1978 could be read in one of two ways. Some of the legislative
statements are in line with a plain meaning interpretation.307 However, others
support the judicially created exception that accounts for de facto hold
harmless agreements that would leave the spouse, ex-spouse, or child
responsible for the debt if the court discharged it.308 However, the one clear
proposition from the legislative history is that Congress did not intend the
payee requirement to be ignored,309 and it should have always been a vital
requirement for nondischargeability.
Legislative statements accompanying other amendments to § 523(a)(5),
such as the 1994 Congressional Record discussed previously, would support
courts uniformly embracing the exception to the plain meaning rule.310 The
House Report outlining the 2005 Amendments does not offer any insight into
interpreting § 523(a)(5)’s payee requirement.311 However, none of the
legislative history implies that courts should completely ignore the payee
requirement. All of the legislative history affirms that there is indeed a
legitimate payee requirement, and the courts need to consider it along with the
rest of the requirements when determining the dischargeability of a domestic
support obligation.
b. Analyzing § 523(a)(5)’s Policy Considerations
The policy behind a provision of the Code, although not a contemplated
canon of construction, received added weight as a means of statutory
interpretation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Marrama, and this analysis

307 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (“This language . . . will apply to make nondischargeable only
alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly to a spouse or dependent.”).
308 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (“The proviso, however, makes nondischargeable any debts
resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor’s spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent
that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse . . . .”).
309 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 16, 59 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 102, 129
(intending to create “a uniform and expanded definition” for domestic support obligations that “includes a debt
owed to or recoverable by . . . a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor”); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79
(making only those family support obligations nondischargeable that are “owed directly to a spouse or
dependent”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (making only those family support obligations nondischargeable
that are “owed directly to a spouse or dependent”).
310 See 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (“If such ‘hold harmless’ and
property settlement obligations are not found to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, they are
dischargeable under current law.”).
311 Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 16–17, 42–43, 52–53, 59–62, 84, 95 (listing all places where
domestic support obligations are mentioned) .
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must consider it.312 The bankruptcy policy behind § 523(a)(5) is different from
the rest of the § 523 exceptions from discharge.313 Normally, courts strictly
interpret exceptions against the creditor, making it very hard for a creditor to
prove that a claim is nondischargeable.314 Section 523(a)(5), however,
represents a different policy completely—one that makes it easier for creditors
like former spouses and children to argue that debts owed to them are
nondischargeable.315 By consciously allowing a policy contrary to the norm,
Congress intended to guide § 523(a)(5) and to elevate and protect oftvulnerable family members’ claims above other creditors.316 Congress’s desire
likely does not reach to the protection of third parties, such as banks and
attorneys, who argue that their claims are nondischargeable.317 Protection of
family and those who are most deserving of support through bankruptcy is
necessarily limited to those who genuinely fit into the category of “family.”
Combined, the canon of construction analysis and the weighted
considerations of congressional purpose and policy paint a rough picture of
how courts should interpret the payee requirement language. Yet it is easy to
forget that this issue does not take place solely in the arena of bankruptcy. The
interpretation of these words in § 523(a)(5) also has repercussions in family
law. All of these cases involving debtors and their ex-spouses or children exist
simultaneously in two areas of law: one involving the debtor’s bankruptcy, and
the other involving the family law that governed the establishment of the debt
at issue in the bankruptcy. The interpretation of the payee requirement can
potentially lead to inequities and hardship on the family law aspect of this
issue.
c. Analyzing the Repercussions of § 523(a)(5)’s Payee Requirement on
Family Law
To interpret the language of §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A) plainly and strictly
would be to limit the availability of a multitude of settlement possibilities
during divorce or separation. Instead of being able to assume responsibility for
312

Braucher, supra note 235, at 350.
See Levin v. Greco, 415 B.R. 663, 665 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
314 See id.
315 Id.
316 See id.
317 Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371 B.R. 761,
765 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (“Congress intended in [§] 523(a)(5) to ensure the support of a debtor’s family,
not to turn a debtor’s family members into debt recovery associates. This is evidenced by the words of the
defined term itself: ‘a domestic support obligation.’”).
313
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their former spouse’s mortgage payments or attorney’s fees, or participate in
hold harmless agreements, the non-debtor-spouses would have to negotiate and
attempt to require their counterparts to simply pay them large sums of money
directly.318 Courts would only declare debts owed directly to the spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor nondischargeable, severely restricting the
bargaining power of the spouse in divorce proceedings. It would narrow the
world of possible divorce- or separation-related financial settlements to only
those that could be owed directly to a former spouse or child. This scenario
could potentially wreak havoc on divorce and separation settlements, and it
eliminates all creativity the courts may have had in fashioning fair resolutions.
Even more unsettling is the idea that divorcing couples who have expended
time and effort reaching a final settlement could be surprised in bankruptcy
court when, unexpectedly, their negotiated support and alimony claims are
discharged. Many couples and families that go through divorces also find
themselves, at some later point, in bankruptcy court.319 If courts were to begin
following the strict and plain meaning of § 523(a)(5), a great deal of the
settlements that inevitably undergo scrutiny in bankruptcy courtrooms would
fall victim to discharge, and the payments they order would no longer function
as support for the non-debtor spouse or child.
Furthermore, the recent trend of courts deciding dischargeability according
to the plain meaning could lead to forum shopping by debtor-spouses who owe
support obligations that are not recoverable directly by their ex-spouses or
children. And while attorneys can draft their clients’ settlement orders in such
a way that they are compatible with the interpretations of the bankruptcy courts
in their area, the truth of the matter is that few people truly anticipate being
hailed into bankruptcy court320 and cannot anticipate when or where that
litigation will occur. This plain meaning interpretation seems to lead to
consequences that may not be disastrous yet would certainly be inequitable.
The past, present, and future repercussions caused by the courts’ varied
interpretations have been and will continue to be troublesome. These disparate
judicial decisions have eliminated all predictability and have saddled attorneys
and their clients with unacceptable uncertainty.

318 This scenario would likely satisfy the payee requirement, as the debts would be owed directly to the
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) (2006).
319 Bankruptcy Site: Statistics, supra note 20.
320 See Austin, supra note 32, at 1396.
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These important family law considerations are all reasons why, instead of
following the plain meaning, courts should uniformly embrace the judicially
created exception to § 523(a)(5)’s payee language. The judicially created
exception is an elegant catch-all that strikes a fair and equitable balance
between interpreting the plain meaning of the language and allowing for
consideration of the family law equities involved. If courts embraced this
exception, they would remain true to the intent of the statute without simply
eliminating the payee requirement. Each court would consider who would be
ultimately responsible for the debt and would subsequently find the debt
nondischargeable if it were any of the listed payees in § 101(14A). With this
exception, those parties with reasonable separation agreements providing that
the debtor pay certain obligations on behalf of his ex-spouse or children (such
as mortgage payments, attorney’s fees, or guardian ad litem fees) will be able
to argue that those debts should be nondischargeable. The payees who benefit
from those obligations will not suddenly face unforeseen financial liability.
This position is supported by several cases that declare hold harmless
agreements and debts owed to third parties nondischargeable because the
spouse or child would end up responsible for the debt.321 For years, courts that
have not favored the majority’s habit of ignoring the payee requirement have
followed this narrow exception from the plain meaning,322 and their
interpretation is the best option for applying the § 523(a)(5) payee requirement.
d. Courts Should Embrace the Exception to the Plain Meaning of
§ 523(a)(5)’s Payee Language
Nowhere in the application of various canons of construction, the
legislative history, or the policy background is there any validation for reading
the payee requirement completely out of § 523(a)(5) as some courts have
done.323 To protect the truly deserving domestic support obligation creditors
from those creditors who would falsely argue that the obligations owed to them
are nondischargeable domestic support obligations, courts should embrace and
apply the judicially fashioned exception that has been in practice long before
the 2005 Amendments. Courts that have embraced this exception—such as the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Spong, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina, and the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
321

Steinfeld, supra note 32, at 280.
See, e.g., Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 10–11 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Andrews, 434 B.R.
541, 546–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010); In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 289, 296 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008).
323 See supra Part III.B.3.a–b.
322
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District of Arkansas—have successfully walked the line between following
Congress’s intent, remaining true to the statutory language, and preventing
§ 523(a)(5) abuse.324 This judicially created exception that allows
consideration beyond the plain meaning of the statute but still respects and
follows that language, is the method of interpretation courts should use in
analyzing the payee requirement of domestic support obligations.
4. Practical Advice for Attorneys and Their Family Law Clients
While courts continue to vary their interpretations of § 523(a)(5), attorneys
and their debtor and non-debtor clients need to be prepared for any of the
approaches bankruptcy courts might take. To be the most secure in divorce and
separation agreements, attorneys need to ensure that if one spouse owes
support to another (or to a child) according to a separation or divorce
agreement, the agreement needs to provide for direct payments to either the
spouse or child. In the areas where courts have recently begun to apply the
plain language to domestic support obligation disputes, this designation of
payment is absolutely necessary to maintain the nondischargeability of the
support obligation.325
The next safest approach that attorneys can take for their divorcing clients
is to execute hold harmless agreements if the spouse owing support has taken
on payments to third parties, such as banks (for mortgages) or attorneys (for
attorney’s fees incurred in divorce-related litigation). In any of the jurisdictions
that apply the judicially created exception or those that simply eliminate the
payee language from the analysis, this approach most likely would be
sufficient to make the debt nondischargeable. In the jurisdictions that only
consider the nature of the debt, there need not be a hold harmless agreement—
as long as one could easily categorize the obligation as support for a child,
spouse, or former spouse, the payee requirement should not raise any issues.
However, because courts are altering the way they analyze domestic support
obligations, there is no way to predict whether bankruptcy courts will begin to
follow the plain language trend. Attorneys must prepare for all contingencies.
This uncertainty and the multiple contingencies attorneys must plan for
with domestic support obligations illustrate the main issue surrounding
324

See, e.g., In re Spong, 661 F.2d at 10–11; In re Andrews, 434 B.R. at 546–48; In re Johnson, 397 B.R.

at 296.
325 See, e.g., Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 371
B.R. 761, 764–65 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
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domestic support obligation exceptions. Attorneys and their clients should not
be uncertain about which debts courts will declare nondischargeable and which
they will not. In some situations, banks and attorneys will be able to have
courts declare their claims nondischargeable, while in other areas, spouses or
children who hold claims that the debtors do not pay directly to them will have
their obligations discharged in their ex-spouses’ or parents’ bankruptcy.
Interpreting the domestic support obligation without the payee requirement
will only permit and encourage fraud by third parties and violate the policy and
meaning behind the statute. Courts should not apply the nondischargeability
exception in a way that totally overlooks the payee requirement.
This area of the Code desperately needs both a clear method of interpreting
the § 523(a)(5) payee requirement and consistency in its application. The
judicially created exception to the plain meaning of the payee language is one
solution to this difficult issue. It is the most prudent of all the possible methods
of resolution because it takes into account and reconciles the competing forces
involved in construing statutory language in this area.
CONCLUSION
Family support obligations arose from Congress’s respect for family and its
desire to preserve and elevate the status of potentially vulnerable family
members who are going through bankruptcy and divorce. This purpose has
been manipulated into an avenue for third parties, such as banks and attorneys,
to obtain greater protection and an elevated priority status in bankruptcy.
Sparse legislative history and policy motivations contrary to those behind the
rest of the Code have created a varying and inconsistent body of case law
surrounding § 523(a)(5). Courts’ interpretations of the statutory language prior
to the 2005 Amendments were inconsistent, with most courts simply ignoring
the plain language of the statute and fashioning their own avenues through
which to except otherwise dischargeable obligations. Courts thus entirely
bypassed the § 523(a)(5) language that required the debt be owed “to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor” and simply ascertained whether the debt
was in the nature of support. This muddled jurisprudence continued even after
Congress amended § 523(a)(5) in 2005, and since then the confusion has only
grown. Now, § 523(a)(5) excepts “domestic support obligations,” as defined in
§ 101(14A). This definition mirrors the requirements of the pre-2005
§ 523(a)(5) but is laid out in a format that unmistakably lists the payee as an
equal and separate requirement for nondischargeability.
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Recent cases such as Tucker v. Oliver and In re Brooks have begun to
interpret the statutory language plainly. Although this is a step towards
creating consistency in judicial decisions, it does not comport with the purpose,
policy, and equities surrounding this section’s place in bankruptcy law and
related areas of family law. Similarly, the majority of courts, which still
essentially read the payee requirement out of the statute, is deviating from the
purpose, policy, and equities involved in the nondischargeability decision.
Some courts have devised an exception to the plain meaning rule, which
manages to remain true to the language of the statute while accounting for the
external factors affecting the method of interpreting the payee language. This
judicial exception is a necessary catch-all to address many of the issues that
occur when family law and bankruptcy law intersect.
The confusion among courts as to the correct approach towards the payee
requirement in domestic support obligations has created unacceptable
uncertainty and a lack of uniformity in nondischargeability jurisprudence. The
American justice system strives for consistency, stability, and predictability in
the application of law, especially in courts operating in the same jurisdiction.
Currently, the disparity among those deciding these bankruptcy cases
according to the plain letter of the written law and the freedoms that the
majority of courts are taking challenges the integrity of the Code. Although
this statutory section is rife with confusion, a uniform approach to the payee
requirement of § 523(a)(5) will be a significant step in the right direction.
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